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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effects of different labor market structures on the 
level of unemployment. A theoretical interpretation of an open economy 
version of the Calmfors and Driffill framework with traded good sector and 
sheltered non traded good sector is presented, in which different wage-
employment trade-offs faced by unions in traded and non traded goods sector 
as well as the degree of openness is taken into account. From a theoretical 
point of view the framework supports the idea of the hump-shaped 
relationship between the degree of centralization of the bargaining process 
and the level of unemployment, which is sustained even with increased 
openness. Countries with an intermediate level of bargaining are expected to 
benefit most in terms of lower unemployment from an increase in openness. 
In an empirical part, the model is applied to a panel of 20 OECD countries 
over the period 1970-2000 and the predictions of the model are tested. I find 
empirical support for both of the main hypothesis, particularly if the strength 
of the employment protection is additionally taken into account. The results 
render also support to the literature on the interaction of product market 
regulations and labor market institutions, as countries which face stronger 
competition in the product market from foreign producers stand to benefit 
more from a deregulation in the labor market via a weakening of the 
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This paper investigates the e⁄ects of di⁄erent labor market structures
on the level of unemployment. A theoretical interpretation of an open
economy version of the Calmfors and Dri¢ ll framework with traded good
sector and sheltered non traded good sector is presented, in which di⁄er-
ent wage-employment trade-o⁄s faced by unions in traded and non traded
goods sector as well as the degree of openness is taken into account. From
a theoretical point of view the framework supports the idea of the hump-
shaped relationship between the degree of centralization of the bargaining
process and the level of unemployment, which is sustained even with in-
creased openness. Countries with an intermediate level of bargaining are
expected to bene￿t most in terms of lower unemployment from an in-
crease in openness. In an empirical part, the model is applied to a panel
of 20 OECD countries over the period 1970-2000 and the predictions of the
model are tested. I ￿nd empirical support for both of the main hypothesis,
particularly if the strength of the employment protection is additionally
taken into account. The results render also support to the literature on
the interaction of product market regulations and labor market institu-
tions, as countries which face stronger competition in the product market
from foreign producers stand to bene￿t more from a deregulation in the
labor market via a weakening of the employment protection legislation.
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11 Introduction
It is widely accepted today that the labor market and its ability to absorb shocks
can play an important role for the economic performance of an economy. The
post-70s experience in many European countries contrasts sharply to the com-
paratively low unemployment rates in the United States and Japan. The extent
to which the labor market is decisive in determining the level of unemployment
or more recently the extent to which di⁄erent labor market structures have vary-
ing abilities to absorb macroeconomic shocks has received great attention in the
￿eld of labor economics. Is there something like an ideal labor market structure
that should be implemented to reduce unemployment rates, or do labor markets
have only marginal e⁄ects? Does one scheme ￿t all countries, or is it the overall
design that matters? Various articles have been investigating these questions.
A central paper in this discussion that focused on the wage bargaining system
is the article by Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988) that proposed a hump-shaped re-
lationship between the level of bargaining and the unemployment performance.
The argument has been criticized on theoretical as well as empirical ground, and
it has been argued that with an increase in openness to trade the relationship
gets blurred and the level of wage bargaining does essentially not in￿ uence the
unemployment performance anymore. This paper adds to this discussion by
reinterpreting the Calmfors-Dri¢ ll hypothesis in an open economy context with
traded and non traded good sector.
The goal of the paper is to evaluate, whether di⁄erent labor markets perform
better in terms of employment even if openness to trade has increased. More
precisely, I provide a theoretical argument that, controlling for other variables,
the hump-shape is unlikely to disappear, despite increased openness. Within
this framework, the potential e⁄ects of increased openness under di⁄erent labor
market constellations are then analyzed.
In the initial chapter, I revise brie￿ y the body of theoretical literature that
has coined the discussion on the macroeconomic performance of economies with
di⁄erent wage setting structures. Based on the ￿ndings of this literature and
allowing for di⁄erent wage-employment trade-o⁄s for unions in the traded and
non traded sector, an adjusted version of the theoretical framework is proposed
in Chapter 3. The theoretical implications of the model are formulated in Chap-
ter 4 and tested in an empirical exercise. Chapter 5 concludes and formulates
possible policy implications.
From a theoretical point of view, the main contribution of this paper may
hence be seen in the explicit consideration of the non traded good sector in a
multilevel bargaining set up to allow for a more encompassing picture in order to
analyze the implications of di⁄erent labor market structures in an open economy
on the unemployment level. Furthermore, I am not aware of an empirical paper
that investigated the e⁄ect of openness to trade interacted with di⁄erent labor
market structures.
22 Literature Review
The major part of the theoretical literature has focused on analyzing union
behavior in an integrated labor market (i.e. assumed free movement of labor
between sectors), while a smaller amount of literature builds on the dual labor
market approach in which skill di⁄erences are the primary motive for di⁄erent
wages that can be maintained in an economy (See Layard et. al. 2003 or Dixon,
Thustrup Hansen and Jacobsen Kleven 1999). For the purpose of this paper it
is essential to ￿lter the di⁄erent arguments in the literature and to provide a
motivation for the possible outcomes of di⁄erent labor market structures. As a
complete literature review on the subject is well above the scope of this paper, I
will focus on the part of the literature which is essential for the analysis of this
paper.1
Although the literature on corporatism and union behavior dates further
back, the main reference papers on the issue of wage bargaining at di⁄erent lev-
els of centralization is the paper by Calmfors and Dri¢ ll. Calmfors and Dri¢ ll
(1988) proposed in their article the well cited hump-shaped relation between
centralization of wage bargaining and macroeconomic performance in a closed
economy. According to the paper countries with highly decentralized or very
centralized union wage setting should experience a lower real wage increase and
have lower unemployment rates than countries that are characterized by indus-
try level bargaining. The argument is based on the optimization behavior of
trade unions, which will lead in the case of decentralization to lower wage de-
mands due to increased market competition. Moving towards more centralized
wage bargaining increases the market power of the unions and the scope for
higher wage demands, but also entails a partly o⁄setting e⁄ect through the in-
creased price level associated with higher wages. At the most centralized level,
unions will again demand lower wages due to the incorporation of the externali-
ties that one sector￿ s wage increase poses to the other sectors￿real wage via the
higher price level which o⁄sets the market power consideration (Calmfors and
Dri¢ ll 1988, p.34). Despite the paper￿ s contribution to the academic discus-
sion on labor market structures and their macroeconomic implications, it has
one major drawback: open economy aspects were not taken into account even
though the country sample analyzed consisted of various open economies.
The open economy issue has been addressed at a later stage by Dri¢ ll and
van der Ploeg (1993) as well as Danthine and Hunt (1992). The paper by Dri¢ ll
and van der Ploeg looks at an open economy whose consumption basket consists
of home and foreign goods. Wage setting either takes place at a decentralized
level in each of the competitive ￿rms that produce a homogenous good, at a
national level or at an international level. This gives rise to an international
version of the hump-shaped relationship, which implies that wage bargaining
at the national level results in higher unemployment and higher real wages.
The result is analogous to the Calmfors-Dri¢ ll argument only that here, at the
national bargaining level, the negative e⁄ect on the foreign CPI is not taken
1For a more detailed analysis of labor market structures and their macroeconomic impli-
cations see Layard et. al. (2003) and Flanagan (1999).
3into account, an externality that is internalized under wage setting at an inter-
national level (Dri¢ ll van der Ploeg 1993, p.382). Danthine and Hunt (1994)
instead maintain the set up of Calmfors and Dri¢ ll, but split the goods￿produc-
tion into Home and Foreign. Consumption follows the Dixit-Stiglitz approach,
with Home goods and Foreign goods being the least substitutable baskets. The
more disaggregated the consumption basket becomes the closer the goods are
to each other. This set up allows analyzing the outcomes of di⁄erent levels of
wage bargaining in the respective countries.2 Danthine and Hunt ￿nd that if
bargaining in both countries is at the same level of aggregation the intermediate
level performs the worst in terms of unemployment rates. Furthermore, coun-
tries with more centralized wage setting structures seem to perform less well
in terms of employment when having a trading partner that tends towards a
more decentralized structure (Danthine and Hunt 1992, p.21). For both cases,
Danthine and Hunt ￿nd that the more integrated the economies become the less
pronounced the hump-shape will be.
Besides the more detailed nature of the Danthine and Hunt paper, both
papers hint at the better performance of decentralized systems compared to
alternative levels of bargaining (in the national context). The main caveat
of both papers is that the non traded good sector is not modeled explicitly,
preventing the possibility to take into account the fact that traded good sector
workers do face a di⁄erent trade-o⁄ between employment and real wages than
the sheltered non traded good sector does. Hence, the way that Danthine and
Hunt model stronger integration - via an increase in substitutability between
all domestic and foreign goods - may appear inappropriate as primarily the
traded good sector will be a⁄ected by the integration process in terms of a more
pronounced trade-o⁄ between unemployment and real wages.3
The di⁄erent trade-o⁄faced by unions in traded and non traded good sector
is taken account of in Rasmussen￿ s paper (1992). Taking the world price for
traded goods as given, he ￿nds that an increase in the wage in the traded good
sector leads to less employment in the sector and lower overall income, which
reduces demand for non traded goods lowering the price for non traded goods.
This tends to decrease employment and increase real wages in the non traded
good sector. According to Rasmussen the negative employment e⁄ect tends
to outweigh the wage e⁄ect, which will induce wage setters in the non traded
good sector to demand a lower wage (Rasmussen 1992, p.569). For economies
that tend to be less open, Rasmussen ￿nds that under non cooperative wage
setting real wages in the traded good sector will tend to be lower than real
wages in the non traded good sector. Furthermore he proposes the concept of
￿centralized bargaining cooperation￿ , in which the two unions determine both
wages jointly. He concludes that in such a centralized set up, wage di⁄erentials
tend to be less pronounced and the outcome to be a pareto improvement to the
2Beissinger and B￿sse (2002) present in a similar model international spillover e⁄ects,
which allow the trading partner to a⁄ect the unemployment rate of the home country.
3The argument that unions in the traded good sector face a more severe trade-o⁄ is very
prevalent in the literature but hardly found in the theoretical models. See for example Calm-
fors (1993), Rasmussen (1992) or Abdersen et al (2000).
4decentralized wage bargaining.4 However, Rasmussen￿ s predictions with respect
to employment performance and real wages are less precise and the modeling
approach does not allow for bargaining at di⁄erent levels as shown in Calmfors
and Dri¢ ll.
Summarizing the above it may be stated that the literature on wage bar-
gaining that introduced bargaining at di⁄erent levels either disregarded the open
economy aspect (like the initial paper by Calmfors and Dri¢ ll 1988), or did not
model this explicitly. While Danthine and Hunt (1994) introduce increased
integration over a higher elasticity of substitution at the level of aggregation
between Foreign and Home goods, the paper does not take account of the fact
that unions in the traded good sector and unions in the non traded good sector
do face di⁄erent trade o⁄s due to the competition from abroad that gives less
room for maneuver when deciding the wage (price) level. Rasmussen (1992)
takes account of this fact, however models bargaining solely in the whole traded
good sector and non traded good sector acting independently or, in the cooper-
ative scenario, for the overall economy, which does not permit him to look at a
more detailed set up as in Calmfors and Dri¢ ll.
The model presented in the next paragraph tries to overcome these short-
comings, by extending the open economy framework by Danthine and Hunt
through explicitly modelling the existence of traded and non traded goods sec-
tor and introducing di⁄erent wage-employment trade-o⁄s in traded and non
traded goods sector. Furthermore, the general structure of the Calmfors and
Dri¢ ll framework is maintained in order to allow for the wage setting to take
place at di⁄erent levels of centralization.
3 The Theoretical Framework
The set up of the (static) model follows essentially the idea laid out by Calmfors
and Dri¢ ll (1988) and later Danthine and Hunt (1992). However, the approach
includes an essential adjustment. The existence of non traded and traded good
sector is taken into account in order to allow for the di⁄erent wage employment
trade-o⁄ faced by non traded and traded goods sector, where the later faces the
foreign competition and therefore a higher elasticity of substitution for similar
brands. This will essentially result in a set-up which incorporates the traditional
Calmfors-Dri¢ ll argument at one extreme and the Danthine and Hunt version
at the other extreme. The model is not solved explicitly but given in a general
form.5
4However, ￿simple￿centralized bargaining in this set up tends to be unstable as one union
stands to loose from co-operation compared to the decentralized wage setting outcome (Ras-
mussen 1993, p. 574).
5The derivations follow Danthine and Hunt (1994), but are adjusted wherever the non-
traded good sector comes into play. For more details on the underlying model see Calmfors
and Dri¢ ll (1988) or Danthine and Hunt (1994). See Appendix IV for the derivations.
53.1 The Baseline Model
I will present a simple model (based on Danthine and Hunt 1992) in which the
traded good sector faces stronger competition, i.e. home goods and foreign goods
are close substitutes. This represents the case where the wage employment trade
o⁄ in the traded good sector is more severe than in the non traded good sector,
such that a wage increase leads to higher unemployment in the traded good
sector compared to an equivalent increase of the wage in the non traded good
sector.6 For simplicity, labor is immobile between sectors, which will essentially
lead to di⁄erent wage settlements in traded and non traded good sector.7
Production
Both sectors are characterized by a large number of competitive ￿rms, which
produce according to the following production function:
Y
￿





T;i = AK￿ + (1 ￿ A)L
￿
T;i (2)
1=1￿￿ represents the constant elasticity of substitution between capital (K)
and labor (L). A is a constant parameter. The number of ￿rms in the overall
economy is held constant. Following Danthine and Hunt, I set the capital stock
equal to one in each of the ￿rms.8 The labor demand and the (inverse) output
supply can be derived from the ￿rm￿ s maximization problem taking the wage
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6This may be justi￿ed as ￿in tradable sectors with strong foreign competition, the di⁄er-
ences in terms of wage outcomes may be small between bargaining at industry and ￿rm level.
Industry bargaining is more likely to lead to higher wages than ￿rm-level bargaining in the
private non-tradable sectors.￿ (Calmfors 1993, P.169). The di⁄erential treatment of traded
and non traded good sector may also provide an implicit argument for the decline in national
bargaining systems which has been observed in the Scandinavian countries (See Dri¢ ll 2005,
p. 8)
7This is certainly a strong assumption and limits the predictive power of the model to a
rather short run description of the economy. However, in an extension (part 3.2) I show that
the main conclusion remains unchanged when changing the assumptions such that there is a
uni￿ed wage within the country.
8As the following analysis focuses on the e⁄ects of di⁄erent labor markets, considerations
with respect to capital are above the scope of this essay.
6Consumption
Consumers in the respective country derive utility from the consumption of
traded and non traded goods:
U = C + h(WR) (5)
, with C = Ca
T ￿ C
1￿a
N and h(WR) being the utility derived from the ben-
e￿ts received when being unemployed.9 Preferences are of Dixit-Stiglitz type
with three levels of aggregation (See Appendix 1 for a graphical illustration
of the consumer preferences and resulting production structure for the case of
a=1/2).10 More precisely, goods are imperfect substitutes, with the elasticity
of substitution between the consumption baskets decreasing with higher lev-









When looking at this level of aggregation we ￿nd from utility maximization
the demand for traded goods and non traded goods:11
CT = a ￿
I
PT










aa(1 ￿ a)1￿a (8)
, where the nominal exchange rate has been set equal to unity. Demands for






























9The bene￿ts are assumed to be ￿nanced through lump sum transfers paid by the workers
in each ￿rm such that the bene￿ts drop out of the budget constraint.
10The minimum number of levels of aggregation to generate a hump-shaped structure is
three. Although, Danthine and Hunt work with more sublevels (i.e. 5), this analysis limits
itself to the minimum number in order to keep the notation as simple as possible. Clearly the
analysis can easily be extended to more levels of aggregation as well as more branches at each
level of aggregation (e.g. instead of two branches, Danthine and Hunt employ 4 branches at
each nod).
11The respective consumption baskets at the di⁄erent levels of aggregation are given in
Appendix IV.
7PT;i and PN;i refer to the respective price indices of the consumption baskets
and ￿X is the elasticity of substitution between the home and the foreign traded
goods consumption basket, while ￿1 refers to the elasticity of substitution be-
tween the two sub-baskets of the non traded goods. The idea that goods are
imperfect substitutes is captured by ￿X > 1 and ￿1 > 1. Furthermore, the as-
sumption that traded goods face stronger competition (due to the competition
from abroad) than non traded goods is captured by ￿X > ￿1. The fact that
￿X > ￿1 will lead ￿rms in the traded good sector to increase prices less than
in the non traded goods sector, as the loss of demand to foreign producers is
stronger in the traded good sector than the loss of demand to other domestic
producers in the non traded goods sector. In general the elasticities of substitu-
tion within a sector are increasing with a higher degree of disaggregation, such
that: 1 < ￿1 < ￿X < ￿Y < ￿2 ￿ ￿Z.12 The intuition behind the increasing
elasticity of substitution at lower levels of aggregation is that the goods become
closer substitutes.13



















Moving down one stage in the aggregation ladder, gives the demands for
those subgroups:










































1￿￿2 for i=1,2 (16)
12In order to generate the di⁄erent wage-employment trade o⁄ in traded and non traded
good sector it is only necessary to have 1 < ￿1 < ￿X.
13One may think of the choice a consumer makes at the highest aggregation level of traded
goods between durables (e.g. automobiles) and non durables (food), two baskets which have a
low elasticity of substitution ( ￿X). At the next level of aggregation the consumer will choose
between, say, an SUV and a normal passenger car (for the automobiles) and vegetables and
meat (for the food). At the lowest level of aggregation the choice would then be between the
brands (say Peugeot and Volkswagen). One can see from this idea that the elasticities are
increasing with an increasing level of dis-aggregation, which is captured by: ￿X < ￿Y < ￿Z
in the traded good sector.
8And at the most disaggregated level for the traded good sector:
























1￿￿Z for i￿ j=1,2 (18)
In equilibrium consumption of non traded goods must equal production:
CNTG = YNTG: This allows pinning down the equilibrium conditions. Note
that this also implies that the traded and non traded good sector can basically
be treated separately as each sector￿ s nominal consumption must equal its value
of production. More precisely, the Cobb-Douglas structure will result in the
fact that a change in the price of non traded goods will be exactly o⁄set by a
corresponding change in the quantity of non traded goods such that the value
of
P
PN;i;jYNTG;i remains unchanged. Furthermore, as CNTG = YNTG and the
consumption of non traded goods is CNTG = (1 ￿ a)￿I=PNTG there is no e⁄ect
on the demand for traded goods or the wage setting in the traded good sector
stemming form wage changes in the non traded good sector.
The monopoly union approach to wage determination
In this simple approach to wage setting, unions are able to decide the wage
and ￿rms are left to determine employment. When each union maximizes inde-
pendently it takes the other unions￿wage as given.14 Given that (a) determines
the division of demand between non traded goods and traded goods, a=1 would
imply that there will be no demand for the non traded good sector. If the pro-
duction structure would not adjust to such a change in a, this would result in
complete unemployment for all the labor formerly employed in the non traded
good sector. Therefore, the way in which ￿rms allocate themselves between
traded and non traded good sector will depend on (a). More precisely, in terms
of the graph in Appendix 1, when a=1 all ￿rms constitute part of the traded
good sector, and we have the case of the Danthine and Hunt open economy.
On the other hand, if a=0 all ￿rms will produce for the non traded good sector
and we are in the original Calmfors and Dri¢ ll framework. The labor that can
potentially be employed in a ￿rm, whether non traded good sector or traded
14Although a wage bargaining approach, where the ￿rm and the union set the wage by
jointly maximizing their utilities with the respective weights to union utility and ￿rm utility
representing the respective bargaining power, is a more realistic set-up, I make use of the
monopoly union approach as Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988) have shown that the outcome would
not be altered signi￿cantly. Nevertheless, I will make use of the concept of relative bargaining
strength in the empirical part of the paper. The intuition of this concept is straight forward:
If the trade union does have a stronger bargaining position (either due to a high level of union
coverage or a favorable legal framework) the wage tends to be higher.
9good sector will hence always be identical and equal to Mi, the union members,
independent of (a). Furthermore, the demand facing a single ￿rm in the non
traded good sector for its variety in the case of a=1/2, will be the same as in
the case of a=0, while the demand facing a single ￿rm in the traded good sector
will be the same under a=1/2 and a=1.15 For simplicity, I will only contrast
the cases of a=0, a=1/2 and, a=1 as these cases are essentially contrasting the
three di⁄erent scenarios.16
The case of decentralized wage setting
Given that workers contribute to the production of either non traded or
traded goods, a union at the ￿rm level will maximize the utility deriving from
the wage that maximizes the following function taking, respectively, the labor
demand in non traded good sector or traded good sector into account (a similar
function holds for unions in the traded goods sector):





+ (Mi ￿ Li;NTG)￿ V (19)
The ￿rst term is the utility (v) derived from the real wage paid to those
members of the union that will remain employed and the second term re￿ ects
the members that will not be employed anymore (Mi ￿ Li;NTG) and derive
utility ￿ V , with ￿ V being de￿ned as: ￿ V = h(WR)











From the labor demand function, the output supply function as well as the
demand for each single variety one can derive the wage chosen by the union in
the non traded good sector:












15This is quite intuitive, as the income being spent on non traded goods is twice as big as
the income spent on non traded goods under a=1/2, but also the number of ￿rms in the non
traded good sector has doubled. A similar reasoning applies to the case of a=1. Appendix II
and III illustrate the consumption and production structure for the case of a=1 and a=0. For
a formal derivation of the equality of demands see Appendix IV.
16For any value 0 < a < 1, the analysis is conducted identical to the framework set out
in this paper, but would require more branches at the upper nods. E.g.: if there were three
branches at the nod CN and three branches at the nod CT;2 ; a = 1=3 would result in a
production structure, in which two branches would be at the nod of CT;2 and 4 bracnhes at
the nod of CN.
10and in the traded good sector:












Essentially the wage is a mark-up over the utility derived from leisure which
depends on the unemployment bene￿ts WR. Higher unemployment bene￿ts
tend to raise wage demands. ￿NTG and ￿T are the elasticity of labor demand
with respect to the real product wage in non traded and traded good sector,
respectively. Clearly, a higher elasticity tends to decrease the wage demands as
it would imply a strong loss of employment in response to a small increase in
the wage. sNTG;k is the share of income spent on non traded goods that goes
to the single good k.17 Of particular interest are aii and aki, which represent
the respective elasticity of the price of product k and product i with respect
to a wage increase in ￿rm i.18 These elasticities depend on all the elasticities
of substitution between the goods, i.e. from the lowest to the highest level of
aggregation in the non traded good for (21) and all the elasticities in the traded








sT;kaT;ki) = f(￿T;~ ￿T) (24)
It is possible to show that if the elasticity of substitution between the ￿nal
goods (in the underlying framework) increases, wage demands decrease, which
is a quite intuitive result. A higher degree of substitution between products
will lead to a stronger loss in employment, as consumers will react to the price
increase of product i that follows the wage increase in ￿rm i, by substituting
into consumption of the other product that is the closest substitute. Hence, the
closer varieties are to each other, the lower will the wage demand be.
Moving Towards Centralized Wage Bargaining Levels
The analysis of the wage bargaining at higher levels of aggregation (i.e. for
more centralized bargaining levels) proceeds identical to Calmfors and Dri¢ ll.
17With the symmetry assumption and in equilibrium every union setteling for the same
wage rate the share will be the same for all non traded good producers.
18Both can be obtained by deriving the respective output supply equation for industry k
with respect to the wage rate in industry i while taking into account the demand for the single
product k.
11At the intermediate level of bargaining, unions cooperate and set jointly the
wage rate. I follow Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988) and regard union cooperation
as the maximization of the sum of the union￿ s utility functions that cooperate.
Hence, at the second lowest level of aggregation, there are always two unions
that cooperate in a group and there are four groups in each country (two in the
traded good sector and two in the non traded good sector). The maximization
problem may hence be rewritten for this level (for a single group in the non
traded good sector) according to:











+ (Mj ￿ Lj;NTG) ￿ ￿ V (25)
An identical condition holds for the other union. This utility function implies
that, when setting the wage, union i takes into account the e⁄ect that the wage
change has on the members of union j. The ￿rst order condition for union i is


























￿ Lj;NTG = 0 (26)
If @Uj=@Wi > 0 (and then also due to symmetry @Uj=@Wi = @Ui=@Wj > 0)
at the wage rate found for the decentralized setting of the former paragraph
then it follows that ￿i = ￿j > 0. Therefore, compared to the decentralized
case, the wage needs to increase in order to satisfy the ￿rst order condition
that maximizes the unions￿objective function. Whether @Uj=@Wi is positive
or negative depends on the relative size of the two e⁄ects that are essential to
the analysis: the ￿cross-employment e⁄ect￿and the ￿real income e⁄ect￿ . While
on the one hand, a higher wage in ￿rm i leads to an increase in the demand
for product j and hence an increase in the demand for labor such that a higher
wage can be realized which increases the utility of union j. On the other hand
the increase in wage i leads to an increase in the general price level which tends
to decrease the real wage and reduces union j￿ s utility.
The ￿rst e⁄ect, represented by @Lj;NTG=@Wi ￿ (v ￿ ￿ V ) is higher the easier
the two goods are substitutable. The idea here is that, if unions from ￿rms that
produce close substitutes cooperate and set commonly a wage rate, prices for
the two goods will be the same. This results only in substitution e⁄ects towards
products that are less close substitutes, but there will be no substitution between
12the two products. Given the tree structure of consumption with decreasing
elasticities of substitution between products at a higher level of aggregation,
the cooperating unions face a lower elasticity of demand for labor with respect
to the nominal wage increase. At any higher level of aggregation the elasticity
of demand for labor gets even lower as substitution between products decreases,
pushing cooperating unions to set higher wages (Calmfors and Dri¢ ll 1988,
p.33). The second e⁄ect, ￿the real income e⁄ect￿ (represented by @vj=@Wi ￿
Lj;NTG in the FOC) leads instead to the opposite e⁄ect. The bigger the share
of unions that cooperate, the bigger the share of their aggregate production
in the overall price index. This tends to decrease the wage demands at higher
levels of aggregation as the e⁄ect on the real wage tends to o⁄set the gains due to
increased market power. The combination of these two o⁄setting e⁄ects gives
rise to the hump-shaped form of wage demands when moving from a system
of decentralized bargaining to a system of centralized bargaining in the non
traded good sector.19 It is worth pointing out that the highest level (i.e. the
national level) of wage bargaining is where wage bargaining takes place at the
aggregate level of traded goods and non traded goods, respectively. Although
unions of both sectors could theoretically cooperate, there will be no scope for
wage changes as the Cobb-Douglas structure impedes any further gains from
wage cooperation.
Hence, wage bargaining is decentralized if wages are set at the most disaggre-
gated, i.e. the ￿rm level, where each union cares only about its own members.
The intermediate level of bargaining in this framework is then represented by the
case in which the two unions of the products which are closest substitutes coop-
erate by taking the e⁄ect of the own wage setting on the other unions￿members
into account (e.g. in terms of the graph in Appendix I, the union in ￿rm CN;2;1
annd CN;2;2 cooperate and the unions in ￿rm CN;1;1 annd CN;1;2 cooperate).
Centralized wage bargaining is then achieved when four unions co-operate, i.e.
￿rms CN;2;1, CN;2;2, CN;1;1,and CN;1;2.
Increase in Openness
An increase in openness to trade can be captured via two channels. Firtsly,
an increase in the share of consumption being spent on traded goods (a) clearly
leads to an increase in openness. Secondly, following the idea of Danthine and
Hunt (1994) an increase in openness may be modelled via a stronger competition
from abroad which would be re￿ ected by a higher elasticity of substitution
between the traded home and foreign goods (￿X):20 It is worth noting that the
case of a = 0 corresponds essentially to the original closed economy version by
Calmfors and Dri¢ ll and the case of a = 1 corresponds to the open economy
version of Danthine and Hunt.21 When modeling openness as an increase in
19For given parameters, this was proven in Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988) and Danthine and
Hunt (1994).
20Holding the other elasticities of substitution constant.
21Note that a=0 applies due to symmetry to the home and the foreign economy such that
there will be neither a demand from home nor from foreign for traded goods. For a graphical
illustration of production and consumption structure under a=0 see Appendix II and for a=1
see Appendix III.
13the size of the traded good sector, the hump-shape will not disappear, but
will be closer to the less pronounced hump-shape in the traded good sector (as
represented in Figure 1). This is not only a result of the fact that I do not
model the increase in trade through an increase in the elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign goods (as Danthine and Hunt did), but through an
increase in the size of the traded good sector. It is much more a result of the
fact that the non traded good sector does not face any foreign competition.
Even if the increase in openness is modeled exactly as in Danthine and Hunt,
that is over the increase in the elasticity of substitution, it would only apply
to the traded good sector, but the non traded good sector and its hump-shape
would remain una⁄ected (as represented in Figure 2, where the overall economy
hump moves with the traded good sector hump). Only a complete elimination
of the non traded good sector (i.e. setting the expenditure share for non traded
goods equal to zero: a = 0) and an increase in the elasticity of substitution (￿X)
would reveal the same conclusion as the one found by Danthine and Hunt. This
however is an unlikely scenario, given the signi￿cant shares of income spent
on non traded goods. Therefore, una⁄ected by how the increase in openness
is modeled (i.e. either through an increase in the share of the traded good
sector in consumption (a) or as in Danthine and Hunt via an increase in the
substitutability between home and foreign goods), I ￿nd, as Danthine and Hunt,
that the gains from stronger foreign competition in terms of employment are
potentially highest in the intermediate case, where the hump is at its peak, but
that the hump-shape should not disappear unless there is no more non traded
goods sector and competition is close to perfect.
143.2 Extension
The fact that unions were constituted along the lines of traded and non traded
goods, as well as the fact that workers contribute either only to the production
of non traded goods or only traded goods, is quite ad hoc and unlikely to re￿ ect
reality. Furthermore, a sustained wage di⁄erential is hard to defend in the long
run. Therefore, some adjustments are necessary to overcome these shortcomings
in the baseline model. I will sketch in the following an extension to the baseline
model which will essentially leave the outcome unaltered but result in a more
realistic setting.
The consumption pattern and the production function remain unchanged.
The adjustment is made with respect to the mobility of labor and the way in
which unions set wages. Labor is homogenous and may either be employed in
the production of the non traded good or the traded good. Each ￿rm is assumed
to produce a fraction of total output as non traded good and another fraction
of output as traded good.22 This implies that each worker will potentially
contribute a fraction of its work time to the production of the non traded good
22In terms of the graph in Appendix 1 this implies for the case of a=1/2 that a sinlge ￿rm
owns the production of one non traded good and one traded good (i.e. ￿rm 1: CN;1;1 and
CT;2;1;1 ; ￿rm 2: CN;1;2 and CT;2;1;2, ￿rm 3: CN;2;1 and CT;2;2;1 , and ￿rm 4: CN;2;2 and
CT;2;2;2. For the case of a=1/3, each ￿rm would own the production of two non traded goods
and one traded good (See also footnote (16) for the case of a=1/3).
15(1 ￿ a) = Mi;NTG=(Mi;NTG+Mi;T) and the rest of the time to the traded good
production a = Mi;T=(Mi;NTG + Mi;T).23
The case of decentralized wage setting
Given that workers contribute to the production of non traded and traded
goods the union at the ￿rm level will maximize the weighted utility deriving
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The ￿rst line is the utility derived from the working time devoted to the
production of the non traded good and the second line represents the utility
derived from the working time devoted to the production of the traded goods.
There will hence be only one wage rate within a ￿rm and due to symmetry, in
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Looking at the extreme cases of open (a=1) and closed economy (a=0), it






















But (29) and (30) are nothing else then (20) for the traded good sector and
the non traded good sector, respectively. Hence, for any value 0 < a < 1 the
23That the fraction is set equal to the expenditure share on traded and non traded goods,
respectively, is certainly somewhat restrictive, but allows for the tractability of the model. A
more involved approach would be to set the fraction equal to the actual, instead of potential,
working time devoted to the sector (i.e. Li;T=L and Li;NTG=L).
24For a=0, it follows that there will be no demand for the traded goods neither from home
nor from abroad. The production will alter such that the ￿rms relocate from traded goods to
non traded goods. Therefore a=0 implies that LT=0 and LNTG=L. For a=1, it follows that
LNTG=0 and LT=L.
16wage rate that applies to each worker in a ￿rm that produces non traded goods
and traded goods will be in between the two extreme wages when considering
traded good sector and non traded good sector separately, as in the basic model.
Whether the wage will be closer to the higher wage in the non traded good sector
or closer to the lower wage in the traded good sector will be determined by the
actual value of (a) and the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution between
foreign and home goods, according to @Wi=@a < 0 and @Wi=@￿X < 0. With
0 < a < 1; the wage in the economy will be above the wage in the traded good
sector and below the wage rate in the non traded good sector, compared to the
baseline model. Therefore, prices for non traded goods will be lower than in the
baseline model and supply bigger while prices for traded goods will be higher
than in the baseline model and supply will be lower.
The analysis with respect to union cooperation proceeds then analogous to
the baseline model, where it can be shown again that the wage for 0 < a < 1 will
be in between the two extremes. Therefore, the basic outcome remains unaltered
but the economy exhibits only one wage for each level of wage bargaining.
The model carries in its baseline as well as its extended version three testable
hypothesis, of which two have already been formulated by either Calmfors and
Dri¢ ll or Danthine and Hunt. Firstly, as noted by Calmfors and Dri¢ ll inter-
mediate bargainers tend to exhibit a higher level of unemployment than cen-
tralized or decentralized bargainers. Secondly, as found by Danthine and Hunt,
increased openness to trade should lead to lower levels of unemployment, where
intermediate bargainers should bene￿t more in terms of lower unemployment
from an increase in openness. And thirdly, as stated above, the hump-shaped
relationship between the degree of centralization and the level of unemploy-
ment should persist for credible levels of openness, favouring centralized and
decentralized wage setting systems over intermediate systems even in the open
economy context.
4 Empirical Analysis
The model described in the previous chapter is completely static and does not
give any predictions about dynamics (Dri¢ ll 2005, p.2). However, simply look-
ing at the average unemployment rates and the level of bargaining structure is
less likely to give an insightful picture as too many potential independent vari-
ables would be left out of consideration.25 It appears hence logical to approach
the analysis by looking at the performance of di⁄erent countries in terms of
unemployment over time including the wage bargaining level as a dummy vari-
able.26 Additionally, the wage setting structure (dummy) will be inter-acted
25See Flanagan (1999, p.1165) for a critique of this problem in former empirical analysis.
However, in Appendix VI, this simple relationship is provided graphically.
26Similar approaches have bee taken by various authors, e.g. Layard et al (1991) and
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). An overview of models using changing institutional variables
or ￿xed ones can be found in Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005).
17with a measure of openness in order to test whether ￿intermediate bargainers￿
tend to have lower unemployment rates when the competition from increased
openness becomes stronger.
4.1 The Data27
The limited availability of data on labor market structures restricts the analy-
sis essentially to 20 OECD countries over the period 1970-2000. Additionally,
various variables are only recorded in two year intervals, or with even lower
frequency. As the interest is in explaining the level of unemployment, the stan-
dardized unemployment rate as provided by the OECD is used as dependent
variable. The outlined theoretical framework has provided indications with re-
spect to the choice of the explanatory variables. Central to this analysis is
the degree of wage centralization.28 The indicator chosen here is based on
two separate indicators: centralization of wage bargaining and coordination of
wage bargaining.29 The centralization variable is provided by the OECD on a
￿ve-year average basis and takes values from 1 to 5, increasing in the degree
of centralization. The coordination indicator, which is taken from the dataset
of Nickell et al (2001), takes values from 1 to 3, where higher values refer to a
higher degree of coordination on union and employer side. I distinguish between
three types of wage setting systems: centralized, intermediate and decentralized
systems. A country is classi￿ed as centralized, if it either exhibits a centralized
system of wage setting (i.e. the centralization indicator takes the value 4 or 5)
or a country has an intermediate level of centralization and additionally a high
level of coordination (values above 2.25 for the coordination index), which theo-
retically allows to o⁄set the negative e⁄ect from the intermediate centralization
system. Intermediate systems are countries with a value of centralization be-
low 4 and above 2 and a value of coordination below 2.25. Countries with low
levels of centralization (a value below 2 for the centralization index) are con-
sidered as decentralized, irrespective of the degree of coordination, as I do not
expect additional bene￿ts from coordination when systems are decentralized.
The reader may refer to Appendix V for an exact grouping of the respective
countries according to the above described framework.
27The exact description of the data used in the regression is given in Appendix V, with
detailed information on sources and abbreviations used within this paper.
28Due to the importance of this variable in the context of this paper, a brief discussion of
the literature with respect to the choice of the variable that re￿ects the wage setting system is
given in Appendix V ("Labor Market Variables"), in order to motivate more thoroughly the
indicator used in this paper.
29Elemeskov et al (1997) and Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2004) have applied a very similar
technique in constructing their wage bargaining indicator. However, it is notoriously di¢ cult
to determine which index is most appropriate. Kenworthy (2001) gives a good overview over
the controversy about which index is preferable and lists 15 indicators from di⁄erent authors
which are supposed to re￿ect either behavioural or formal characteristics of wage setting, some
of which take government involvement into account others rely on union concentration, while
others again rely on the pure formal setting.
18To test the hypothesis on the e⁄ect of openness under di⁄erent degrees of
centralization, the three dummies of centralization are inter-acted with a mea-
sure of openness. Two main measures of openness were considered: trade in %
of GDP and imports in % of GDP. As openness in the above framework is un-
derstood as increased competition from foreign competitors, the import measure
promises to capture this idea better than trade in % of GDP, which includes
exports that do not necessarily increase competition. Nevertheless, all models
have also been re-estimated using trade in % of GDP as openness indicator,
because also exports face foreign competition, albeit in third markets. Instead
of taking only the current value of imports into account, I use the average of the
imports in % of GDP over current period and the values in the two preceding
periods. The rationale for doing so is that wage setters are possibly perceiving
increased competition from foreign competition from import penetration in the
past, which￿ s e⁄ects are observable for the unions.
Another variable that a⁄ected unemployment in the framework is the ￿fall-
back wage￿in the case of unemployment (￿ V = h(WR) ). Anything that increases
this value tends to increase wage demands and thereby increase unemployment.
To re￿ ect this, I use the bene￿t replacement rate in the respective countries,
which is basically a measure of how much a person can expect to get from the
unemployment insurance relative to the former wage earnings in case of becom-
ing unemployed. This measure is then multiplied with a measure of duration
for the bene￿ts. The data for the bene￿t replacement rate is provided by the
OECD in two year intervals and the duration measure is taken from Nickell et
al. (2001).
Besides these variables which derive directly from the theoretical framework
developed in chapter 3, it is important to control for other explanatory variables
that may in￿ uence the unemployment rate, namely: union power, employment
protection, and taxes.
It is plausible that stronger union bargaining power will induce unions to
raise wages more. The literature distinguishes here between two indicators: the
union density and the union coverage. Whereas the former one re￿ ects the part
of the labor force that is a union member the second indicator re￿ ects the actual
part of the labor force which will be covered by the negotiated wage agreement
that unions determine jointly with the employer organizations. Although it
would be preferably to use both indicators, only union density is available over
the studied period.
An additional variable that has been used widely to explain unemployment
rates is the restrictiveness of employment protection. The expected sign in this
case is however not so clear. While a higher degree of employment protection
may prevent ￿rms from ￿ring easily and thereby prevent the ￿insiders￿ from
loosing their job, a higher degree may also make ￿rms more reluctant to employ
new workers, as the cost of ￿ring in a downturn is high, and thus may increase
unemployment.
The di⁄erence between the actual wage rate the employee receives and the
wage the employer pays, the so-called tax wedge, may also a⁄ect the unemploy-
ment rate. One would expect a big tax wedge, i.e. a net wage the employee
19receives that is well below what the employer pays to increase unemployment as
ceteris paribus a higher tax rate induces the employee to increase wage demands
in order to keep his net real wage unchanged. Given that such an increase would
be realized, the employer will face a higher marginal cost for an unchanged level
of productivity and therefore will have to reduce employment to increase the
marginal productivity of labor.
Active labor market policy is another variable used in some empirical studies
that attempt to explain the unemployment level. Unfortunately, the available
data dates only back to the early 80s and can hence not be used in the analysis.
I introduce additionally a constructed variable based on the Employment
Protection Legislation Index and the inter-acted openness measure.30 The ra-
tionale behind this ￿Pressure Index￿ is that the competitive e⁄ect stemming
from increased openness may be dampened if employment protection is high
and unions do not perceive the higher trade-o⁄ between unemployment and
wages, as unions believe that ￿￿ring￿ is unlikely due to the high protection.
Hence, I simply divide the value of the lagged imports by the value of the
EPL Index, such that countries with higher degree of employment protection
perceive less pressure from foreign competition than countries with lower em-
ployment protection but the same level of openness. The construction of this
index ￿nds a further motivation on the basis of the rather recent literature on
the interaction of product market regulations and labor market institutions (See
for example Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003 or Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2004). This
literature starts from the assertion that regulations can lower the intensity of
competition between ￿rms. Thus deregulation may increase competition as the
number of ￿rms may increase, increasing output and employment and lowering
potential rents (Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2005, p.7). This in turn may pave the
way for competitive wage setting, as the scope for distribution between ￿rms
and workers shrinks, which encourages moderate wage setting (Berger and Dan-
niger 2005, p.5). Although, the literature focuses primarily on restrictions to
￿rm entry, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2004, p.2) state that one measure of prod-
uct market competition can be seen in the foreign competition (i.e. openness
to trade) of a country. The authors￿estimation results ￿strongly suggest that
reforms in both labour and product markets are needed to raise signi￿cantly
long-run employment rates￿ , where the labor market institutions encompass
the employment protection legislation (Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2004, p.3). The
importance of EPL as an indicator for restrictions in the labor market is con-
￿rmed by the assertion that ￿the insider power of workers employed in ￿rms
sheltered from competitive pressures can be compounded by the presence of
unduly restrictive EPL, pushing up wage premia and lowering equilibrium em-
ployment￿(Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2004, p.8). Also Kugler and Piga (2004) ￿nd
in an empirical investigation that the two policies are complements and that the
gains from labour market reforms are only reaped when product markets are
30Other authors have already inter-acted the wage setting dummies with the EPL index,
￿nding a di⁄erential e⁄ect of EPL under di⁄erent wage setting systems. See for example Belot
and van Ours (2000) or Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2004).
20deregulated as well.31
Hence, the idea of the literature on product market regulations and labor
markets involves the assertion that strict product market regulations impede
competition in the product market and lead to imperfect competition, making
labor market deregulations less e⁄ective. Though imports in percent of GDP is
certainly not a perfect indicator for the extent of product market regulations, the
idea that is supposed to be covered by the openness indicator, namely re￿ ecting
the extent of foreign competition, is similar to the notion in that literature.
The ￿Pressure Index￿covers, therefore, also to some extent the notion of the
literature with respect to the complementarity of the two policies, as a reduction
in the EPL will have a stronger impact, when coupled with a higher level of
openness.
Besides these labor market variables, I make use of one additional macro-
economic variable in order to re￿ ect the current state of the economy. More
precisely, I use the output gap to re￿ ect whether the economy in the respective
period was coined by rather a growth above trend or below, in order to capture
possible deviations from the equilibrium rate of unemployment. By including
the output gap in the regression I attempt to capture any possible cyclical ￿ uc-
tuation in the unemployment rate which has not been taken out yet through
the averaging over ￿ve years. This allows the analysis to focus on the structural
and not the cyclical determinants of the unemployment rate.
Descriptive Statistics
A look at the data reveals quickly that the variation in the unemployment
rate in the sample is wide, with the mean being roughly 6%. The variation
across countries is more pronounced than within individual countries, except
for the output gap. This holds for all the variables used in the regression.32
The variation in the degree of centralization across countries and time can be
found in Appendix V. The sample of 20 OECD countries has seen a move to-
wards less centralized systems of bargaining across time. Also the measure of
openness reveals a wide spread. Interestingly, countries with decentralized wage
setting systems tend to be less open than their counterparts, while intermediate
bargainers are slightly more open on average than centralized systems. Look-
ing instead at the ￿pressure index￿reveals the opposite picture: Decentralized
systems do perceive foreign competition stronger than centralized systems and
those stronger than intermediate systems. This result is attributed to the fact
31The complementarity of these two policies is straightforward to show in a theoretical
framework. In a schedule of the labor market with a given labor demand and supply curve,
the increased competition in the product market would lead to a rightward shift in the de-
mand curve as well as a ￿attening of it, due to the higher elasticity of substitution between
the increased number of products. This leads to a higher real wage and employment level.
However, the augmentation of the employment level would be magni￿ed, if there were a par-
allel movement of the labor supply curve to the right. Such a movement can be obtained by a
deregulation in the labor market which, for instance, could be a reduction in the employment
protection, which makes employers more willing to hire workers and weakens the position of
unions, rendering the labor supply curve ￿atter and moving it possibly to the right (Estevªo
2005, p.9). See Berger and Danniger (2005) for a simple illustration of this argument.
32See Appendix VI for an overview of the descriptive statistics.
21that decentralized systems tend to have lower employment protection legisla-
tion. The within variation for the ￿pressure index￿is much more pronounced
than for the simple openness measure, which is due to the spread in employ-
ment protection and due to the fact that the data reveals a tendency towards
a reduction in the strictness of employment protection in nearly all countries
starting in the early 80s.33
A preliminary look at the hump-shaped hypothesis, by using a simple graph
of the average unemployment rates across countries with identical bargaining
system, indicates the existence of the hump from the late eighties on, while
the graph rather supports the corporatist idea in the 70s (See Appendix VI).34
However, as mentioned before such a simple static exercise is unlikely to shed
much light on the question, as too many possible explanatory variables, that
might overshadow the relationship are left out of consideration and the answer
to the question should be analyzed via a more encompassing approach.
4.2 Estimation Technique
Given the di¢ culty with the data and the fact that there is little variability over
time of the labor market variables, I continue the analysis by making use of ￿ve
year averages. This appears to be an appropriate approach as the interest is
in explaining rather the structural unemployment level and not the short run
￿ uctuations which are likely to be due to short run variation in macroeconomic
variables. Hence, the regression will be based on a set of 20 countries and 6
observations in time. As stated before, I will make use of panel techniques
in order to capture changes over time and exploit the increase in observations
which allows the inclusion of more explanatory variables than are feasible in a
cross-country regression of only 20 countries.
As the variability of the labor market variables is limited over time and,
as seen in the descriptive statistics section, the variation in the explanatory
variables across countries is higher than over time for the single country, one
tends to prefer generally the use of a random-e⁄ects model over the ￿xed e⁄ects
model. On the other hand, the sample of countries is not drawn randomly,
which would rather suggest the use of a ￿xed e⁄ects model. Given that for some
countries single labor market variables do not change over time, the ￿xed e⁄ects
approach has the disadvantage that these speci￿c countries will not contribute to
the explanation of the coe¢ cient of this variable, while this would not be the case
in the random e⁄ects model. On the other hand, the ￿xed e⁄ect model allows
to some extent to correct for cross country heteroskedasticity via absorbing the
￿xed country e⁄ects, while this is not so in the random e⁄ects model. For
these reasons, I will contrast in the following ￿xed e⁄ect estimation results with
33This observation will later be analyzed in more detail, when applying the regression to a
di⁄rent time period.
34Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988, p. 42) already stated that the theoretical framework is better
suited for the post oil-shock period, as pre 1973 most economies were nearly at full employ-
ment.
22random e⁄ect results, when it is considered important. However, the validity of
the choice of the estimation technique remains to be tested formally.
The general form of the estimated model is the following:
Yit = ￿0 + ￿i + vt + Xit￿ + (wit ￿ zit)￿ + ￿it
Yit represents the unemployment rate over time and across countries. ￿0
is the common constant and ￿i represents the respective country speci￿c time-
invariant e⁄ects. Furthermore, I will allow for ￿xed time e⁄ects (vt), in the sense
that where appropriate time dummies are included. ￿ covers the coe¢ cients to
be estimated for the time-variant variables Xit. ￿ is the coe¢ cient for the inter-
acted openness variable. More precisely, the entire second term from the left
may be written as:




























, where wit is the wage system dummy and zit is the degree of openness
(H, M, and L refer to the level of bargaining which are centralized, intermedi-
ate, and decentralized, respectively). Both variables vary over time and across
individuals.
4.3 Regression Results35
The basic approach here is to start from the simplest regression, directly derived
from the theoretical framework and modify this regression subsequently. The
￿rst regression (Benchmark Model A, Table 1 in Appendix VII), is hence based
on the simple openness indicator and does model the hump by the inclusion of
the dummy for intermediate bargaining systems. The Hausman test rejects the
Null of no correlation between the error term and the independent variables for
the random e⁄ects model, and therefore supports the use of the ￿xed e⁄ects
model. The coe¢ cient on Employment Protection turns out to be negative,
35All estimation results are reported in Appendix VII. The models have also been estimated
using trade in per cent of GDP as openness indicator, instead of imports in percent of GDP.
There are no essential changes with respect to the interpretation of the coe¢ cients. Therefore,
I refer only to the measure of imports in the main text. To facilitate the reading, the labelling
of the models has been designed according to the following key: "A": models that employ
the bargaining dummy interacted with imports in % of GDP; "B": models estimated with
the pressure index and imports being the openness indicator; "C": as "B", but trade being
the openness indicator; and "D": as "B", but excluding the output gap from the estimation.
If the letter is not followed by a number the estimation technique employed is OLS. If the
letter is followed by a number, the number indicates for: "1": that the estimation includes
an AR(1) term; "2": that the estimation is performed in di⁄erence instead of level; "3": that
the estimation is a 2SLS estimation; "4": that the x variables are lagged by one period; "5",
"6" and "7" relate to robustness checks by dropping outliers from the sample.
23while all other coe¢ cients have the expected sign. However, most of the coe¢ -
cients are insigni￿cant, with the output gap, the tax wedge, and EPL being the
exception. When using instead the Pressure Index the picture changes (Bench-
mark Model B). The Hausman test again rejects the Null. Now, all coe¢ cients
turn out to be signi￿cant with the exception of union density and the unemploy-
ment bene￿t measure. All coe¢ cients carry the expected sign. The constant
takes a value of 6.8 which is only slightly above the average unemployment rate
of the whole sample over time. A country that reduces its taxation such that the
tax wedge reduces by 10 percent points is expected to experience a reduction
in its unemployment rate of 1.4%. The particular interest is in the dummy for
intermediate bargainers and the magnitude of the coe¢ cients associated with
the Pressure Index. I ￿nd both the hypothesis to be supported by these results.
Firstly, countries that moved to an intermediate level of bargaining tend to ex-
perience higher unemployment rates. Secondly, the magnitude of the Pressure
Index indicates, that intermediate bargainers experience a more bene￿cial e⁄ect
in terms of lower unemployment rates from a given level of the Pressure Index
than countries with other systems of wage bargaining (-0.153 compared to -0.085
and -0.093 for decentralized and centralized systems, respectively). Including
a dummy for centralized systems does not alter this conclusion. However, the
inclusion of this dummy increases the magnitude of the dummy for intermedi-
ate bargainers to a higher level. Given that the included dummy is insigni￿cant
and does not increase the ￿t of the model, I reject this speci￿cation in favor of
the Benchmark model B.36 One should realize, however, that the coe¢ cient on
the dummy does not re￿ ect the exact e⁄ect of being an intermediate bargainer,
as the coe¢ cient on the Pressure Index is di⁄erent for di⁄erent wage setting
systems. An example based on Model B may illustrate this point: France is
coined by an intermediate level of bargaining and exhibits a value for the open-
ness indicator of 22% by the end of the sample period, while its EPL value is
1.4. To compare the di⁄erential e⁄ect the wage setting system has on France￿ s
unemployment rate, one has to compute the negative impact coming from the
Pressure Index for a ￿xed value of EPL and openness and add this to the value
of the dummy, which will give a value of 1.87 (=4.27 + (-0.153*22/1.4). If
France has had either a centralized system or a decentralized system of bar-
gaining, it would only experience the bene￿cial e⁄ect from the Pressure index,
which would take a value of ￿ 1.46 (=-0.093*22/1.4) or -1.34 (=-0.085*22/1.4),
respectively. Hence, the hump amounts to an unemployment rate for intermedi-
ate bargainers, which is 3.19 percentage points (=1.86-(-1.34)) higher than for
decentralized systems and 3.32 percentage points (=1.86-(-146)) higher than for
centralized systems.
The e⁄ect of employment protection is somewhat more complex as it en-
ters the regression separately and via the Pressure Index. On the one hand, a
lower level of employment protection increases unemployment (an increase by
one point on the scale from 0 to 2 leads to a reduction in unemployment by
36The economic interpretation of only including a dummy for systems with intermediate lev-
els of bargaining is that there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence between decentralized and centralized
economies with respect to the unemployment rate.
24more than 5%). On the other hand, a reduction in the Employment Protec-
tion Index increases the pressure coming from foreign competition and thereby
tends to o⁄set the former e⁄ect. Moreover, the relationship is not linear due
to the particular construction of the index (i.e. dividing the level of openness
by the EPL index). Additionally, the coe¢ cients on the Pressure Index suggest
that employment protection under decentralized and centralized systems a⁄ects
unemployment less via the Pressure index than in the case of intermediate bar-
gainers.37 Therefore, ceteris paribus, the e⁄ect of a reduction of EPL can lead
to an increase or a reduction in unemployment, depending on the level of open-
ness, the bargaining system and the magnitude of the reduction. For example
a country which has an intermediate level of openness (Imports exhibit 30 % of
GDP) and has a quite restrictive level of EPL (1.4) will experience an increase
in its unemployment rate when reducing the EPL to 0.9 by either 1.6%, 1%, or
1.8% in centralized, intermediate and decentralized systems, respectively. Were
the same country to reduce the index from 1.4 to 0.4, the e⁄ect would be a
reduction of the unemployment rate by 2.6% for intermediate bargainers and
an increase in the unemployment rate by 0.6% for centralized systems and 1%
for decentralized systems. The more open the economy in all of the three cases
the less reduction in the EPL is required in order to attain an outcome in which
unemployment rates will fall as a consequence of the increased competition.
These results are in line with Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2004) as well as Kugler
and Puga￿ s (2004) ￿ndings that product market competition and labor market
regulations are complements and that the gains from labour market reforms are
only reaped when product markets are deregulated as well, in the sense that
a liberalization of the labor market through a weakening of the employment
protection legislation is ine⁄ective (and even worse, for very low levels of open-
ness, it has an adverse a⁄ect) with respect to reducing unemployment ￿gures.
Higher levels of openness will always result in lower unemployment rates for a
given level of the EPL. For example a country with an intermediate level for the
EPL (1) will be able to reduce its unemployment rate by 1.53% if the imports
in per cent of GDP increase by 10% points under intermediate bargaining lev-
els and reduce the unemployment rate by 0.85% points or 0.93% points under
decentralized or centralized systems, respectively.
The hypothesis formulated in the theoretical part included the idea hat the
hump-shape will not disappear with increased openness. It is clear however, that
due to the fact that for a given level of the EPL intermediate bargainers gain
more from increased openness in terms of a reduction in the unemployment rate,
there must be a theoretical level of openness at which the gain from increased
openness outweighs the disadvantage from being an intermediate bargainer. The
37A detailed representation of the di⁄erential e⁄ect of the EPL under di⁄erent wage setting
systems is given in Appendix VIII. Nicoletti et al. (2001, p.48) ￿nd also that a reduction in
the EPL has a more bene￿cial e⁄ect on employment for intermediate bargainers than it is the
case for centralized or decentralized bargainers. The authors state in another paper that this
is ￿in line with the hypothesis that when insiders have strong bargaining power, they may
more easily resist attempts by employers to re￿ect high turnover costs (due to strict EPL) in
lower wages, even if this works to the detriment of outsiders.￿(Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2004,
p.26)
25question is hence, at which level of openness does the hump disappear, and is
such a level credible or not? Referring again to the example of France, one can
verify that the hump will persist (though continuously be lower) up to a level of
openness of 85%. Recall that the 85% are imports in % of GDP and the actual
level for France is 22%! Hence, in the case of France, it would require a level of
openness that is close to four times higher than the actual one, for the hump to
disappear. A quite unlikely happening (a doubling of France￿ s openness value
to 44% would reduce the hump by roughly 1% to 2%).38
When contrasting these results to the random e⁄ects model a similar pattern
as in the ￿xed e⁄ects model can be found (with the exception of the tax wedge
that turns out to be insigni￿cant). Even though the Hausman test rejected
the random e⁄ects model (and its results cannot be taken at face value) it is
insightful to take a look at the results as the interpretation of the coe¢ cients
is di⁄erent in the sense that the dummy for intermediate bargainers does not
only apply to those who changed their system, but also to those who have been
coined by an intermediate system of bargaining throughout the entire observa-
tion period. Therefore, these results support the hump-shaped hypothesis as
the coe¢ cients on the pressure index as well as the dummy for intermediate
bargainers show a similar pattern.39
The results in this set of basic regressions, therefore, reject the simple rela-
tionship between openness and wage setting system as laid out in Benchmark
Model A, and support the more complex relationship which takes additionally
the level of Employment Protection into account. Furthermore, the results ren-
der support to the hypothesis of the hump-shaped relationship and the hypoth-
esis that intermediate bargainers tend to bene￿t more from increased openness
in terms of lower unemployment rates than other wage setting systems for a
given level of the EPL Index. The results may also be interpreted in the sense
that the overall design of the labor market matters and its single components
can not always be regarded as having a separable impact.
Alternative Speci￿cations
In order to evaluate whether the model might be mis-speci￿ed, the models
are analyzed on possible problems stemming from heteroskedasticity, endogene-
ity and, serial correlation. A simple White test of heteroskedasticity rejected
the presence of any further heteroskedasticity after estimating the model with
38Using instead of France as example the average values for EPL (1.1) and for the openness
indicator (30) (see the Appendix on descriptive statistics), the hump amounts to 2.4 per-
centage points di⁄erence between intermediate bargainers and decentralized systems and 2.6
percentage points with respect to centralized systems. It would require more than a doubling
of the average level of the openness indicator in order for the hump to disappear, which is still
very unlikely. This is true when using imports or trade as openness indicator. See Appendix
IX for more details on the e⁄ect of increased openness on the hump-shape, computed for the
average level of EPL in the sample.
39The hump for Model 2, when following again the procedure as laid out for France in
the example, amounts to an unemployment rate which is 3.97 percentage points higher for
intermediate bargainers compared to decentralized systems and 4 percentage points higher
compared to centralied systems.
26￿xed e⁄ects.40 The adjusted Durbin-Watson statistic, however, indicates that
there may still be some autocorrelation in the error term, even though ￿ve year
averages have been used in the estimation. It is clear that the unemployment
rate in a particular year will be highly correlated with its value in the preceeding
year. Over a 5-year average this link becomes somewhat blurred. Furthermore,
when estimating a panel of 5-year averages the primary interest is not in re-
trieving the best ￿t, but in attempting to explain the structural (equilibrium)
level of unemployment as determined by exogenous, rather institutional vari-
ables. Hence, from an economic point of view modelling an AR(1) structure in
the error term does not help in explaining the structural level of unemployment
and why it might have changed over time. Nevertheless, it is important from an
econometric point of view to see whether the inclusion of this adjustment will
change the results dramatically and thereby question the explanatory power of
the model when estimated in its structural version.
When re-estimating the model and including an AR (1) process (model B1),
the explanatory power as measured by the within R-squared of the structural
part reduces to 0.56. The coe¢ cient on the taxrate remains unchanged. Now,
the coe¢ cient on the unemployment bene￿t measure becomes signi￿cant at the
10% level and has the expected sign. Although the magnitude of the coe¢ cients
on the variables of interest have changed, the interpretation remains unchanged.
More precisely, the hump for the average sample (EPL=1.1 and imports=30),
amounts to an unemployment rate which is 2% higher when comparing in-
termediate bargaining to decentralized bargaining systems and to 2.03% when
comparing intermediate bargaining to centralized bargaining systems. Again it
would require more than a doubling of the openness indicator for the hump to
disappear. Also the e⁄ect of the EPL indicator is similar to the benchmark
model￿ s behavior. The basic pattern remains unchanged, but the bene￿cial ef-
fect stemming from a reduction in the EPL becomes somewhat stronger and the
di⁄erence between the wage setting systems becomes less pronounced than un-
der the baseline model.41 Unfortunately, simply including an AR(1) structure
in the error term leads to a bias in the reported standard errors due to the cor-
relation between the ￿xed e⁄ects and the AR(1) term. Though this estimation
technique is frequently employed in the literature, allegedly due to the ￿nite
sample bias of robust estimators, it has been shown that not accounting for the
serial correlation through robust standard errors creates a bias which is bigger
than any possible bias deriving from the ￿nite-sample problem, at any sample
size (Kezdi 2006, p 3). It may, therefore, be more appropriate to re-estimate
baseline model B with autocrrelation robust standard errors through employing
the Newey-West estimation of the covariance matrix for serial correlation of or-
40However, the models have been re-estimated by GLS, correcting for cross-section het-
eroskedasticty. All the results remain valid. Estimation results are not reported. Many
authors in the literature routinely use heteroskedastic robust standard errors though some
papers ￿nd in formal testing that homoskedaticity can not be rejected (See e.g. Bassanini and
Duval (2006)).
41See Appendix VIII for the exact results of a change in the EPL on the unemployment
rate under the di⁄erent models.
27der one, instead of including an AR(1) term in the ￿xed e⁄ect regression.42 All
the signi￿cant coe¢ cients of model B remain signi￿cant at the same level, except
for the output gap which is now only signi￿cant at the ￿ve percent level.43
While the majority of the emprical work on the determinants of unemploy-
ment regard the labor market institutions as causal and hence exogenous, the
argument of policy endogeneity of institutions has gained importance in the
literature, in recent years.44 Since the late nineties, various authors started
addressing the possibility of reverse causality and endogeneity going from the
unemployment rate to various labor market institutions. Daveri and Tabellini
42Baccaro and Rei (2005, p.43) employ in a similar regression this technique.
43As the change in the t-values do not alter the results of model B, estimation results are
not reported here, but are available from the author.
44See Saint-Paul (1996) as one of the main proponents of this view or Lalive and Zweimuller
(2003).
28(1997, p.24) proposed that high unemployment rates are likely to a⁄ect unem-
ployment bene￿ts and labor taxes as governments may be forced to increase
taxes in order to pay the bene￿t entitlements of the increased number of un-
employed. The authors address the problem by using the lagged value of those
right hand side variables as instruments, and argue that ￿if the residuals of
the unemployment equation are uncorrelated over time, these are pretty good
instruments￿(Daveri and Tabellini 1997, p.25). Baker et al (2005, p.22) con-
￿rm this idea, and assert that this reverse causality might be the reason why
many empirical works that do not account for endogeneity ￿nd a ￿signi￿cant
relationship between higher bene￿ts or tax rates and higher unemployment￿ . In
another paper the same authors go even further and state that ￿with a decline
in employment [..], taxpayers could reasonably want to give unemployed work-
ers additional time to search for the right job [through increased unemployment
bene￿ts], thereby improving the quality of the match between workers and jobs￿
(Baker et al 2006, p.32).
Checci and Nunziata (2004, pp.1-3), who agree that from a political econ-
omy approach all institutions should be considered endogenous, argue more
cautious and state that ￿if institutions are coordinating devices [..] they cannot
be taken as fully exogenous￿ . However, the authors continue by asserting that
￿the common practice to take them as (weakly) exogenous has prima facie some
reliability￿ (Checci and Nunziata 2004, p.1). In their estimation Checci and
Nunziata (2004, p.7) ￿nd that, when instrumenting union density, the causal
relationship runs in the opposite direction, which leads them to conclude that
workers are more inclined to join a union if unemployment is high.
Baccaro and Rei (2005, p.42) go so far as to instrument in one estimation
all institutional variables using their past values as instrument and in another
speci￿cation additionally the macroeconomic variables. However, in the end
the authors favor a ￿xed e⁄ect model in the ￿rst di⁄erence over the estimation
employing instruments.
A very recent paper by Bassanini and Duval (2006) addresses the issue of
endogeneity very thoroughly. The authors point at the potential risk of re-
verse causality, which may be re￿ ected in the action the government takes as a
response to high unemployment rates (Bassanini and Duval 2006, p.15). Basan-
nini and Duval (2006, p.117) instrument of the institutional variables, which
are also present in the estimation in this paper, the tax rate, the employment
protection legislation, the union density and the bene￿t replacement rate using
the lagged values as instruments. The degree of corporatism, which is build in
a similar fashion as in this paper is not assumed to be endogenous.45
45Although the authors do not explicitly state why corporatism is considered exogenous, I
follow the authors￿approach due to the lack of an instrument for this dummy variable. Given
that the variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one or zero, it is impossible to use
the lagged value of the indicator as an instrument. The only explanation why corporatism may
be considered exogenous, may lie in Checci and Nunziata￿ s assertion (2004, p.1) that some
institutions evolve at a slower pace than macroeconomic variables, which would restrict the
argument of reverse causality to institutions that are likely to adjust faster, which is unlikely
to be the case for the bargaining regime which tend to vary little over time compared to other
labor market institutions.
29Hence, there is reason to believe that high unemployment rates are likely
to a⁄ect the shape of the labor market institutions. If this endogeneity proofs
to be strong, not accounting for it is likely to lead to a bias in the estimation
results. There is no generally agreed upon method to address this issue and
given the lack of alternative, appropriate instruments, I make use of a two
stage least squares instrumental variable estimation and follow the literature by
employing the lagged values in the level as instruments for their current value
(model B3) for all institutional (and interacted) variables, except for the wage
bargaining dummy.46 This approach bears two limitations. Firstly, the number
of observations reduces due to the loss of the ￿rst period from potentially 120
to 100 observations. Secondly, if autocorrelation of order one is still detected
when re-estimating the unemployment equation with the use of instrumental
variables, the residuals are correlated over time which introduces another bias,
making the lagged values inappropriate instruments.47
The estimation results, however, reveal that the adjusted Durbin-Watson
does not detect anymore ￿rst order autocorrelation, which makes the use of the
lagged values as instruments feasible (model B3). Also the Jarque-Bera test
indicates the normality of the error terms. The overall ￿t of the model is with a
R-squared of 0.72 still relatively good. Nevertheless, the Davidson-MacKinnon
test of exogeneity does not reject the exogeneity of the independent variables,
with a prob.-value of 0.3. This implies that either the instruments are weak
instruments or endogeneity has only a limited e⁄ect on the estimates. When
testing the appropriateness of the instruments, the Sargens test of overidenti-
￿cation cannot reject the suitability of the instruments, with a prob.-value of
0.38. As this is a rather low value, one should be cautious to conclude that en-
dogeneity does not have a signi￿cant impact on the estimation results. Instead,
when analyzing the potential sources of endogeneity seperately, the Davidson-
MacKinnon test reveals that exogeneity is rejected at the 10 percent level for
the tax rate, the unemployment bene￿ts as well as the employment protection
legislation, which therefore con￿rms the appropriateness of the use of instru-
mental variable technique at least for those three variables.48 Nevertheless, the
implications of the estimation results seem to be in line with the ￿ndings of
the other models. In particular, the hump amounts to an unemployment rate
which is 2.52% higher when compared to centralized bargainers and 2.28% when
compared to decentralized systems and, it still requires more than a doubling of
the openness indicator for the hump to disappear. Furthermore, also the e⁄ect
of a change in the EPL is very similar to the one of model B and B1. The most
remarkable di⁄erence to the ordinary least square estimation appears to be the
magnitude of the coe¢ cient on the tax rate, which increased to 1.92, proposing
a much stronger impact of the tax wedge on unemployment when accounting
46See the former footnote for a comment on the wage setting dummy.
47Another way of addressing the problem of reverse causality is to estimate the equation
by OLS, but regressing the past values of the potentially endogenous variables on the current
value of the unemployment rate. The results of this estimation are reported in the Appendix
VII, Table 2 (model B4) but are not discussed here as the main implications remain unchanged.
48The prob.-value for the joint test is 0.093.
30for possible endogeneity.49
Besides the labor market variables, possible endogeneity may also stem from
the output gap to the unemployment rate. Again, a good instrument is not
readily available and the lagged value seems inappropriate as the correlation is
quite low, which is likely to stem from the fact that I am considering ￿ve-year
averages. However, as I am not interested in the coe¢ cient for the output gap
but simply make use of this variable as control variable, I re-estimate model
B, leaving out the output gap in order to evaluate whether this a⁄ects the
coe¢ cients signi￿cantly, implying a possible bias stemming form the endogeneity
of this variable.50 Leaving out a variable that has explanatory power, however,
is at the cost of another possible bias stemming from the omitted variable.
Nevertheless, either of these biases seem to be limited as a regression without
the output gap (model D3) gives nearly identical coe¢ cient estimates and leaves
the explanatory power of the model relatively unchanged.51
Another form of mis-speci￿cation may stem from the fact that when look-
ing at the variables on a yearly basis a unit root can not be rejected for all
variables, but the output gap.52 All the variables are however stationary in the
￿rst di⁄erence. Therefore, in order to avoid any spurious regression problems
the model is re-estimated using the di⁄erence of the variables, except for the
output gap, which remains in the level.53 This time the Hausman test does not
detect any correlation between the error term and the regressors, and strongly
accepts the null, such that the random e⁄ects model is preferred to the ￿xed
e⁄ects estimation. The overall ￿t of the model is 0.5. The e⁄ect of the tax rate
is somewhat lower now with a coe¢ cient of 1.2. The unemployment bene￿ts
are again insigni￿cant as is the union density. The Durbin-Watson suggests
that the problem of ￿rst order correlation is overcome with the use of the dif-
ferences.54 When evaluating the coe¢ cients, it becomes clear that the hump is
less pronounced. For the average sample values, the hump amounts now only
to 1.32 when comparing to the centralized case and 1.43 when comparing to the
decentralized case. However, for the given coe¢ cients, it requires still more than
a doubling of the openness indicator for the hump to disappear. The results for
49This stronger impact is con￿rmed by model D3 and model B4, which both address the
issue of reverse causality.
50On the use of the output gap see also other authors: Elmeskov et al (1998), who do not
instrument the output gap, or Bassanini and Duval (2006), who do instrument the output
gap.
51See Appendix VII for the estimation results. Table 1, Model D for the OLS estimation
and Table, 2 model D3 for the 2SLS estimation without the output gap. The Davidson-
MacKinnon test for model D3 revelas a prob.-value of 0.43 for all institutional variables, 0.19
for the tax rate, the EPL and the bene￿t entitlements and, 0.08 for the tax rate and the
EPL. The Sargens test for overidenti￿cation takes a prob.-value of 0.91, which supports the
conclusion drawn for model B3.
52A unit root test on the 5-year average observations does not promise to give any conlcusive
results as 6 observations in time are to few for the test results to have any relevance. The
results of the test on the yearly observations are not reported, but may be obtained from the
author.
53The results are reported in Appendix VII, Table 2, model B2 when using imoprts as
openness indicator and model C2 when using trade as openness indicator.
54The critical value is 1.73.
31the EPL again follow the same pattern and, the exact magnitude is in between
the results of the benchmark model and model B1.
Given that in all cases, the results do not change in their essence to the
Baseline model, the latter estimation results seem to give a reasonable well
indication of the e⁄ects at play. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that the
actual magnitude of the e⁄ects may be slightly di⁄erent.
Robustness Test
In the following I perform two separate tests. Firstly, I ask whether the
results do change fundamentally when excluding countries from the sample that
are likely to bias the results and secondly, I re-estimate the two benchmark
models excluding the 70s from the sample. The latter does clearly reduce the
number of observations and decreases the power of the estimation. But on the
other hand, the highly signi￿cant time dummies for the two periods in the 70s
as well as a look at the development of unemployment rates across time suggests
that the 70s are coined by lower unemployment rates across all countries, while
the post-oil shock period is coined by a generally higher level of unemployment
(an exception may be the US).
Three outliers in terms of extraordinary developments of the unemployment
rates appear in the sample: Spain, Finland and Ireland. Spain experienced a
drastic increase in her unemployment rate in the early 80s which persisted at
a high level throughout the rest of the period of analysis. Additionally, Spain
switched from a centralized system of bargaining to an intermediate level of bar-
gaining in the late 80s. It is, therefore, likely that the inclusion of Spain tends to
favor the hum-shaped hypothesis. Finland, with its centralized system, instead
experienced a sharp increase in unemployment in the 90s, which has partly been
attributed to the decline of the Soviet Union and Finland￿ s subsequent loss in
exports. Ireland on the other hand experienced an increase in unemployment
during the 80s and the early 90s but recovered by the end of the sample period.
Within this period Ireland switched for one sample period from a centralized
system to a decentralized system. In the ￿rst test I drop Spain from the sample
and re-estimate Benchmark Model B (Model B6). The Hausman test rejects
the use of the random e⁄ects model. As expected the magnitude of the coe¢ -
cients on the intermediate level of bargaining (i.e. the dummy and the Pressure
Index) reduce. Nevertheless, the main conclusion remains unchanged, although
at a less discriminatory level.
Dropping instead Finland and Ireland from the sample, leads not to the
rejection of the random e⁄ects model at conventional levels of signi￿cance. I
therefore proceed by interpreting the results of the random e⁄ects model. Again,
when using the simple openness measure the model performs relatively poor
(Model A5). Using instead the Pressure Index reveals a similar pattern as the
Benchmark Model B, with the exception of the coe¢ cient on the tax wedge
which remained signi￿cant at the 10% level but halved its value (Model B5).
The dummy for intermediate bargainers is highly signi￿cant and proposes a
similar pattern for the hump as in Model B. The Pressure Index does again
support the idea that intermediate bargainers tend to reduce unemployment by
32more for a given level of the EPL Index when openness increases.
When excluding the 70s from the sample the results change to some ex-
tent. Applying the same speci￿cation as in Benchmark Model B, the Hausman
test rejects again the use of the random e⁄ects model. The output gap, the
tax wedge, employment protection and, the dummy for intermediate bargain-
ers are all signi￿cant at the 1% level and have the expected sign (Model B7).
The coe¢ cient on the tax wedge increased somewhat and the di⁄erential e⁄ect
of the Pressure Index becomes more pronounced. Furthermore, the adjusted
Durbin-Watson statistic, with a value of 2.05, does now reject the existence of
an AR(1) structure. Most interestingly the simple openness indicator becomes
now signi￿cant (Model A7). This might be due to the tendency starting in the
80s of a general reduction in employment protection. The less restrictive the
employment protection, the more likely is an economy to react to stronger for-
eign competition in terms of wage restraint, and thereby reducing the negative
impact on unemployment. However, at the same time, the EPL Index becomes
insigni￿cant and the dummy on intermediate bargainers as well. Given the
worsening of the ￿t, I however still reject the use of this model in favor of Model
B5, which employs the Pressure Index.
The various regression results and tests seem to support the conclusions
drawn from the initial speci￿cation in Benchmark Model B, which supports
the theoretical framework laid out in chapter 3. Nevertheless, the variation in
the magnitude of the coe¢ cients when using alternative speci￿cations of Model
B, asks to treat the exact values of the coe¢ cients given in Model B with
caution. Given the various test results, the version of model B, that accounts
for endogeneity (model B3) is likely to give the most robust coe¢ cient estimates.
4.4 Comparing the Results to Former Studies55
Clearly, a direct comparison with the results in other authors￿papers is not
possible with respect to the Pressure Index or the inter-acted openness indicator.
However, it is interesting to see whether the coe¢ cients on the ￿traditional￿
labor market indicators are similar in magnitude to former studies to evaluate
the robustness of these results.
One of the earlier papers that looked at the e⁄ects of institutions on un-
employment is by Nickell (1997). Using a GLS random e⁄ects model with a
time dummy, on a sample of 20 OECD countries, using 6-year averages for the
period 1983-1994, Nickell regressed the log of the unemployment rate on Em-
ployment Protection, Bene￿t Replacement, and Duration, Active Labor Market
Policies, Union Density, Union Coverage, Wage Coordination, the total tax rate
as well as the change in in￿ ation. Nickell ￿nds a negative relationship between
wage coordination and unemployment, but does not check for a possible hump-
shaped relationship. Additionally, his measure of wage coordination di⁄ers from
55Although model B3 should be preferred as a basis of comparison, I compare in the following
the results of baseline model B to former studies￿results, because the studies mentioned here
did not address the issue of endogeneity.
33the measure of centralization employed in this paper. The signs for the other
variables which also appear in Benchmark Model B of this paper are identi-
cal. Unfortunately, except for union density (which appears insigni￿cant in this
paper) the indices used by Nickell are di⁄erent from the ones employed here
and therefore do not allow a comparison of the magnitude of the e⁄ects. Fur-
thermore, one may argue about the appropriateness of applying a set of nine
explanatory variables plus a time dummy on a sample of only 40 observations.
Elmeskov et. al. (1998) conduct a panel estimation of yearly data from
1983-1995 on a sample of 19 OECD countries, using random e⁄ects. The es-
timation results reveal that except for union density and active labor market
policy all other explanatory variables appear signi￿cant in the various speci￿ca-
tions. More precisely, the coe¢ cient of the tax wedge ranges from 1 to 1.4 which
is roughly comparable with the estimates found in this paper. The negative im-
pact of the output gap is with a coe¢ cient between -0.46 and ￿ 0.62, clearly
stronger than the ￿ 0.3 value in Benchmark Model B. This might be due to the
fact that based on yearly observations the unemployment rate reacts stronger
to the cycle, while this e⁄ect is somewhat ￿smoothened out￿when taking 5-year
averages. Contrary, to the results presented here, Elmeskov et. al. ￿nd a posi-
tive relationship between employment protection and unemployment. However,
also here the results are not strictly comparable as this positive relationship is
also present in this paper, although through the Pressure index and only for
a certain discrete change in the employment protection legislation. Elmeskov
et. al. do employ a measure of wage centralization which is comparable to the
one employed in this paper. Essentially decentralized and centralized economies
are treated in the same way as both are included in the dummy of centralized
systems (See Elemeskov et al. 1998, p.216). Using dummies for centralized
(plus decentralized) and intermediate systems, they ￿nd that ceteris paribus a
country with centralized system tends to have an unemployment rate which is
about 2% lower than in countries that exhibit an intermediate level of bargain-
ing. This renders support to the Calmfors-Dri¢ ll argument. The magnitude is
about 0.5 percentage point below the level found in Benchmark Model B, but
comparable to the results found when allowing for an AR(1) structure, when
using the average values for EPL and openness.
Nickell et. al. (2001) perform a panel estimation on a set of yearly obser-
vations for a set of 20 OECD countries over the period 1961-1995, including
the lagged dependent variable and taking account for macroeconomic shocks as
well as interactions between institutions. The coe¢ cient on the tax rate is with
1.59 very close to the value in this study. For employment protection, Nickel
et. al. ￿nd a weak positive relationship, suggesting that if the EPL Index de-
creases by one unit, unemployment decreases by 0.15 percentage points.56 Wage
coordination is modeled according to the corporatist idea.
Belot and Van Ours (2002) estimate a panel of 17 OECD countries over the
56This is approximately equivalent to the e⁄ect of an intermediate bargainer who reduces its
EPL from 1.4 to 0.4 and exhibits a level of openness slightly above 20% in the context of the
model present in this paper. These values could represent the e⁄ect on France￿ s unemployment
rate, if France would have reduced its EPL by one unit by the end of the sample period.
34period 1960-1999 using 5-year averages. When including country ￿xed e⁄ects in
their estimation, Belot and Van Ours ￿nd that a ten percentage point increase
in the tax rate leads to an increase of the unemployment rate by 2.4 percentage
points, a level well above the one in this study. A higher level of employment
protection reduces unemployment slightly (again the indicators are not strictly
comparable to the one employed in this analysis). Finally, Belot and Van Ours
￿nd that centralization is described by the corporatist idea rather than the
hump-shape, which was tested for, but not found signi￿cant.
Other papers that focus rather on the interaction of shocks with macroeco-
nomic variables like Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and Bertola et. al. (2001)
￿nd the traditional labor market institutions tax wedge, employment protec-
tion, wage coordination and unemployment bene￿t duration to be signi￿cant.
Both ￿nd a small positive e⁄ect of employment protection on the unemployment
rate. A 10 percentage point increase in the tax rate reduces unemployment by
roughly 1 percentage point, which is below the levels found in this paper. Again
wage coordination is found to be of a corporatist nature, with the indices being
not directly comparable to the one employed in this paper.
Concluding this comparison it may be stated that the empirical evidence
on the tax wedge seems to be indicating a common direction, with this study
being in the upper-middle range for the value of the coe¢ cient. The controversy
with respect to the hump-shape is re￿ ected in the di⁄erent results mentioned
here. The comparison to other studies leads one to be cautious in taking the
actual magnitude of the e⁄ect found in Benchmark Model B at face value.
The di⁄erential ￿ndings with respect to sign and magnitude of the employment
protection legislation in the literature may be reconciled to some extent by
the ￿ndings in this paper, which proposes a non-linear relationship, but the
existence of two opposing e⁄ects which are at work and may either be in favor
of an overall positive or negative e⁄ect depending on openness to trade and the
bargaining structure.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigated the relationship between labor markets, openness, and
unemployment. A revised version of the Calmfors-Dri¢ ll argument in an open
economy context with traded and non-traded good sector has been proposed.
The implications of this theoretical set-up amount to a fusion of the Calmfors-
Dri¢ ll argument in a closed economy and the open economy extension by Dan-
thine and Hunt, as the hump-shape persists due to the existence of the sheltered
non-traded good sector, but increased trade tends to reduce the hump in the
sense that countries with intermediate levels of bargaining tend to reduce un-
employment by more as a response to the increased foreign competition. In an
empirical exercise this hypothesis has been tested. The evidence does render
some support for the hypothesis, particularly in a broader context in which the
employment protection legislation is taken into account. According to the esti-
35mation results, it requires an unlikely high increase in openness, for the hump to
disappear, making the extremes, either centralized or decentralized wage setting
systems, preferable to intermediate solutions. Furthermore, centralized and de-
centralized economies tend to loose less in terms of higher unemployment rates
due to a strict employment protection legislation, compared to countries coined
by intermediate levels of bargaining. The notion of the literature on product
market regulation and labor market institutions is supported in the sense that
economies which face stronger foreign competition in the product market are
more likely to experience a reduction in unemployment levels when easening em-
ployment protection. The complementarity of the two policies is emphasized by
the result that countries will bene￿t the most from increased trade in terms of
lower unemployment rates, the lower the level of employment protection is. Ac-
cording to the estimates and assuming that openness will continue to increase,
Belgium and the Netherlands seem to have embarked on the right policy by
reducing there respective level of employment protection, while Italy still has a
long way to go and France seems to be going in the wrong direction.
The implications of the empirical ￿ndings in this paper support the current
line of research in labor economics in the sense that emphasis should be put
on the interaction of di⁄erent labor market structures as well as product mar-
ket characteristics, instead of looking at the contribution of single labor market
institutions to the overall performance in an economy. An additional aspect
for possible future research might be to analyze to which extent di⁄erent labor
market structures tend to perform better under di⁄erent macroeconomic con-
stellations, as performed in this paper with respect to the degree of openness of
an economy. Such an approach is likely to give more detailed policy implications
of a ￿country-custom made nature￿instead of a ￿one ￿ts them all￿approach.
36Appendix I: Consumption and Production a=1/2
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39Appendix IV: Derivation of the Results
Production
The labor demand function is derived by solving the pro￿t maximization
problem of the ￿rm with respect to labor: max￿ = y ￿Pi:￿wL￿rK. The ￿rst
order condition reveals then the labor demand:
@￿
@Li




￿ (1 ￿ A)L
￿￿1
i ￿ w = 0 (A1)











































Using the labor demand function in the production function y
￿
i = AK￿ +
(1 ￿ A)L
￿
i and recalling that K = 1 yields the inverse supply function:
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i A￿1 ￿ 1
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The maximization of the utility yields the division of income between the
two consumption baskets. The budget constraint may be rewritten using the







PN;i;jYNTG;i = CTPT + CNPN (A4)
The utility is then maximized according to: maxU = Ca
TC
1￿a
N + h(WR) s.t.
I = CTPT + CNPN: The ￿rst order conditions are given by:
@U
@CT













= 0 = I ￿ CTPT ￿ CNPN (A7)
Using (A5) and (A6) in (A7) yields:








Using (A8) and (A9) in the upper tier consumption basket yields the perfect


































As aggregate income is equal to the value of aggregate production and consump-







aa(1 ￿ a)1￿a (A11)
The demand for the next basket is derived by minimizing the expenditures
for a target basket: minL = CN;1PN;1 + CN;2PN;2 ￿ ￿(CN ￿ ￿ CN); where the













The ￿rst order conditions result in:
@L
@CN;1














































Multiplying both sides of (A13) with CN;1and both sides of (A14) with CN;2
and then adding both equations yields:




















PN = ￿ (A15)


















￿￿￿1 (1 ￿ a)I
PN
(A16)
57The derivations presented here are only performed for the non traded good sector. The
analysis for the traded good sector is analagous and can be easily performed following the same
steps. Note also that the assumption of symmetric countries allows to perform the analysis
by looking only at the demand from the home country.





￿￿￿1 (1 ￿ a)I
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(A17)
Again, the perfect price index for this level of aggregation can be derived by




























































The analysis at the next level, which is the demand for the single non traded













The minimization problem is given by: minL = CN;i;1PN;i;1+CN;i;2PN;i;2￿
￿(CN;i ￿ ￿ CN;i): The ￿rst order conditions yield:
@L
@CN;i;1














































Multiplying (A20) with CN;i;1 and (A21) with CN;i;2 and then summing the
two equation yields:




















PN;i = ￿ (A22)






















￿￿￿1 (1 ￿ a)I
PN
for i and j=1,2 (A23)



























































1￿￿2 for i=1,2 (A24)
Equality of demands
The framework which is presented in this paper builds on two essential para-
meters, (a) which is the share of consumption being spent on traded goods and
￿X the elasticity of substitution between traded goods from home and abroad.
As long as ￿X > ￿1 and ￿1 ￿ ￿Y < ￿2 ￿ ￿Z substitution in the traded good
sector will be stronger than in the non traded good sector and therefore hold
prices in the traded good sector below the levels in the non traded good sector
when wages are determined in the two sectors separately.
In the extension of the baseline model it was argued that the demand for
the traded good variety in the case of a=1/2 is identical to the demand for
a traded variety in the case of a=1 and that the demand for the non traded
variety is identical under a=1/2 and a=0. This is due to the fact that ￿rms
relocate between traded good sector and non traded good sector according to
a. The proof of the equality of demands is performed in the following way:58
The demand for a non traded variety has already been derived in (A23). As
we know that there will be balanced trade, and that in equilibrium CN = YN
it must be true form the utility maximization and the budget constraint that
the non traded good sector "￿nances itself" and PNYN = PNCN = (1 ￿ a)I:
The same logic applies for the traded good sector, which therefore implies that
58The reader may refer to Appendix I-III for consumption and production structure under
the three di⁄erent scenarios.




































































When a = 0, we can derive the demand for a single variety following the
same steps as laid out before, where the utility is now de￿ned over U = T0:5
2 C0:5
N .
Utility maximization will result in the constant shares being spent on the two
sub-baskets, according to: maxU = C0:5
T;2C0:5














Performing again the same steps as before, we arrive at the ￿nal demand for













As the elasticities of substitution applying to CT;2 are identical to the ones
applying to CN and the number of varieties (￿rms) are identical (i.e. four in
each branch), the demand for each variety under a=0 will be identical. That this
demand is equal to the demand under a=1/2 for the non traded good variety
45can be seen via the fact that under a=0 I = PNCN + PT;2T2 and due to the
symmetric structure PNCN = PT;2T2; which implies that: I=2 = PNCN and










Given that the number of ￿rms under a=0 and a=1/2 are identical for the
basket CN, it must be the case that (A30) is equal to (A25), i.e. the demand for
each single non traded variety under a=0 and a=1/2 is identical.59 Therefore,
the wage settlement for the whole economy under a=0 will be identical to the
wage settlement under a=1/2 in the non traded good sector.
a=1
Under a=1 the expenditure minimization amounts to: minL = PHCH +














, where CF refers to the consumption of foreign produced goods and CH to
the consumption of domestically produced goods.
The ￿rst order conditions are given by:
@L
@CH














































Multiplying (A32) with CH and (A33) with CF and summing over both
yields:













PT = ￿ (A34)
Using (A34) in (A32) gives the demand for the home basket:
59Due to the symmetric structure it must then also be true that the demand for the varieties














Each sub-basket of CH will receive half of the demand according to the

















Expenditure minimization at the next level of aggregation than proceeds
according to minL = PT;2;1CT;2;1 + PT;2;2CT;2;2 s.t. CT;2 ￿ ￿ C; where the













Following the by now well known procedure, by taking the derivatives with
respect to CT;2;1 and CT;2;2 , solving for PT;2;1 and PT;2;2 and, multiplying by
CT;2;1 and CT;2;2, respectively and, then summing the two equations yields:
PT;2 = ￿ (A39)
Using this result in the respective ￿rst order conditions yields the demand

































At the most disaggregated level of aggregation the expenditure minimization
follows: minL = PT;2;j;1CT;2;j;1 + PT;2;j;2CT;2;j;2 s.t. CT;2;j ￿ ￿ C;where the












, for j=1,2 (A42)





















C for j,k=1,2 (A43)
Given that one half of the demand for home traded goods goes to the sub-
basket CN and the other half to CT;2 and both sub-baskets are exactly identical
(with respect to ￿rm size and elasticities of substitution) the price index for













PT;2 = PT;2 (A44)















This is identical to the demand for a single traded variety under a=1/2,
which can be seen by comparing (A45) to (A26) and realizing that C=2 in the
case of a=1 is equal to CT in the case of a=1/2, where the traded good sector
consists of half the amount of ￿rms compared to a=1, while the elasticities
of substitution in both cases are identical. Therefore, under a=1 the wage
settlement, will be identical to the one in the traded good sector under a=1/2
in the baseline model with the wage di⁄erence between traded and non traded
good sector.
Appendix V: Data Overview
The data set contains average values over the period 1970-2000. Except for
the last period (95-00) averages are over a ￿ve year interval. The countries in
the sample are the following 20 OECD countries:
Australia Denmark Ireland New Zealand Sweden
Austria Finland Italy Norway Switzerland
Belgium France Japan Portugal United Kingdom
Canada Germany Netherlands Spain United States
The time horizon are the following averages: 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-
1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, and 1995-2000
Macroeconomic variables:
Unemployment rate (ur)
In order to make the study comparable to other papers, I used the unem-
ployment rate as a ￿ve year average over the data provided by Nickel et al.
48(2001 and 2003) which is based on the OECD harmonized unemployment rate.
The values for Italy are the exception. It is based on the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics ￿correction to the OECD standardized rates￿(See Nickel 2003, for a
more detailed description). To avoid the break due to the German reunion, the
German unemployment rate refers to West Germany.
Trade Openness (lagimp)
The proxy for trade openness used in the regressions is the ￿ve year average
of the average of the imports in percent of GDP over the period t, t-1 and t-2.
The data is taken from the World Bank Development Indicators. Alternatively,
trade in percent of GDP was used. The measure was computed in the same
manner as imports in percent of GDP and is also taken form the World Bank
Development Indicators.
The Output Gap (outputgap)
The output gap is computed by applying a Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter over a set
of yearly observations of constant GDP taken from the World Bank Development
Indicators (base year 2000) and then computing the percentage deviation of the
actual output from its trend. In order to avoid imprecise values for the beginning
and the end of the period a longer horizon was taken to compute the ￿lter (where
available the period 1962 to 2004). Then the values for the 6 respective periods
where averaged.
Labor Market Variables:
Wage bargaining system (corp: hcorp, mcorp, lcorp)
The general discussion about which index to use in order to re￿ ect the wage
setting system of an economy appropriately, builds primarily on two concepts:
wage centralization and wage coordination. While ￿wage centralization￿refers
to the level at which wages are bargained, ￿wage coordination" is a behavioural
concept and refers to the ￿degree of harmony in the wage-setting process￿(Ken-
worthy 2001, p.59 and p.75). Kenworthy (2001) notes that:
￿[..] a structural measure should be preferred in such analyses
because structure is causally prior to behavior. [However,] using
a structural measure to predict macroeconomic performance pre-
sumes [..] that the centralization of wage-bargaining arrangements
determines wage-setting behavior, which in turn determines wage
changes, which in turn determines macroeconomic outcomes. In
other words, two links in the causal chain are assumed. Using a be-
havioral measure of centralization has the advantage of closing one
gap in the hypothesized causal sequence. There seems no compelling
a priori reason to favor either a measure based on wage-bargaining
structures or one based on wage-bargaining behavior. It depends on
the researcher￿ s theoretical interest.￿(Kenworthy 2001, p.72)
Kenworthy (2001, p.7) continues by proposing an alternative index, using
scores based on a set of expectations ￿about which institutional features of
49wage setting arrangements are likely to generate more or less coordination.￿He
creates along these lines an index which idea is similar in structure to the index
used here, in the sense that he constructs an index ranging form 1 (decentralized)
to 5 (centralized), where he considers countries more centralized/coordinated, if
they exhibit besides industry-level bargaining a certain degree of coordination,
bargaining by peak associations, regularized pattern setting or bargaining by a
powerful, monopolistic union confederation (Kenworthy 2001, p.79).
The original index used by Calmfors-Dri¢ ll drew instead on two separate
indices and summed their scores. The ￿rst index referred to within union coop-
eration and within employer organization cooperation and was increasing with
stonger cooperation from 1 to 3. The second index was decreasing from 3 to 1
with increasing numbers of unions and employer organizations (e.g. 3 if bargain-
ing takes place between only one union and one employer organization, hence
at the national level (Calmfors and Dri¢ ll 1988, Annex A)).
Soskice (1990) criticized in his article the approach taken by Calmfors and
Dri¢ ll and proposes to put more emphasis on the coordination across the coun-
try (Soskice 1990, p.41). According to him the degree of coordination in the
wage setting process greatly in￿ uences wage outcomes, and bargaining central-
ization is only one mean, albeit an important one, to achieve such coordination.
Hence, according to Soskice countries like Switzerland are supposed to be clas-
si￿ed as centralized/ co-ordinated instead of treating them as a country on the
lower end of the intermediate bargainers. He notes that using the centralization
measure is unlikely to be wrong when a country is classi￿ed as centralized, as
those countries tend to exhibit also a high degree of coordination. However,
at lower levels of centralization, coordination may be low or high, asking for a
di⁄erent classi￿cation than one solely based on the centralization index (Sos-
kice 1990, p.41). Also Germany, which exhibits a formal wage setting at the
industry level should according to Soskice be regarded as centralized given the
high coordination on the employer side and the general fashion in which one
industry is leading in setting the wage which will be roughly imitated by the
other industries (Soskice 1990, p.44). Disagreement with Soskice and the or-
dering used here relate to the Netherlands and Japan. While, Soskice would
upgrade the Netherlands as well due to stronger cooperation, the case of Japan
is less important as it would move only from decentralized to centralized, both
of which are assumed to generate similar outcomes with respect to wage set-
tlements, according to the theoretical part. Nevertheless, when comparing the
ranking of Soskice to the classi￿cation established in this paper for the period
of the late 80s, one can see that with the exception of Japan, the ranking is
consistent in the sense that the lower end of Soskice￿ s ranking for the degree of
actual coordination (of only 11 countries) is made up by the USA (0), the UK
(0) here classi￿ed as decentralized, the middle ground by France (1.5), Italy (2)
and the Netherlands (3) here classi￿ed as industry bargainers, and the upper
part by Germany (3.5), Sweden (4), Norway (4), Switzerland (4), Austria (5)
and Japan (5), with the exception of Japan all classi￿ed as centralized in this
paper (See Soskice 1990, p.55).
Also Halll and Franzese (1998, p.510) notice that if ￿wage negotiation occurs
50among trade unions and employer organizations that are highly concentrated at
the sectoral level but equipped with su¢ cient economy-wide linkages to transmit
across the economy the settlement reached in a leading sector￿ , one would have
to treat them as more centralized than a less coordinated economy with wage
setting at the sectoral level.
Similarly, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2004) argue that:
￿[..] strong coordination allows industry unions to internalize the
aggregate e⁄ects of their wage decisions into the negotiation process,
de facto mimicking the outcomes of a highly centralized bargaining
regime.￿(p.22).
The authors proceed by considering ￿rst the centralization index and then
￿upgrading￿the intermediate bargainers who exhibit a high degree of coordina-
tion, which is considered as equivalent to a centralized wage bargaining system
(p.22).
Therefore, given the arguments presented by Kenworthy (2001) and Soskice
(1990) it appears important to use on one hand a rather structural measure for
the wage bargaining process, but to allow for the in￿ uence of strong coordina-
tion. This hints at the appropriateness of the procedure employed by Elemskov
et al (1997) and Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2004) in ￿upgrading￿those countries
to centralized countries which exhibit besides an industry level of bargaining a
strong degree of coordination across unions and employer organizations.
The wage bargaining system employed in this paper is, therefore, identi￿ed
via three dummies based on the OECD series of centralization of the wage bar-
gaining process (ranging from 1 to 5) and the wage coordination index provided
in Nickel et al (2001), which is an interpolation of the OECD index of wage
coordination (ranging from 1 to 3). Both indices are increasing in the degree of
centralization and coordination, respectively. More precisely, a value of 1 for the
centralization index refers to company and plant level bargaining, 2 refers to a
mix of plant and industry level , 3 to predominantly industry level bargaining,
4 to a mixture of industry and nationwide bargaining, and 5 to a predominant
role of nation wide wage setting (See OECD Employment Outlook 2004).
The Index used in the empirical analysis is constructed in the following way:
A country is considered:
- centralized if the centralization index is above 3.5 (irrespective of the co-
ordination index) or if the centralization index is above 2 and the coordi-
nation index has a value equal to, or above 2.25. Hence, countries with
intermediate bargaining level but high degree of coordination are ￿ up-
graded￿ in the sense that I expect a high degree of coordination to o⁄set
the negative e⁄ects on unemployment from the sole fact that bargaining
takes place at an intermediate level of bargaining (a similar approach has
been followed by Elmeskov at al 1997) - hcorp
51- as having an intermediate level of bargaining if the centralization index
takes a value from 2 to 3.5 (and does not have a value for the coordination
index equal or superior to 2.25) - mcorp
- decentralized for all other cases (i.e. takes a value below 2 for the central-
ization index) - lcorp
The index will then result in the following grouping for the countries:


































































































































































I believe that this index re￿ ects more accurately the e⁄ective level of wage
setting than using one of the indices separately, which would neglect the positive
e⁄ect that can come from coordination of the wage setting. The table makes
clear that there has been a move towards more decentralized levels of bargaining
over the time horizon.
Union Density (uniondens)
The OECD does provide a series on union density. However, the series is
incomplete for several countries. Hence, I make use of the dataset of Nickel et al
(2001) that is based on several sources (including the OECD) and the updated
￿gures in Nickel (2003). For details on the composition see Nickel et al (2001).
52Tax Wedge (taxrate)
The tax wedge describes the di⁄erence between the wage cost that arise to
the employer and the actual net of tax wage that is available to the employee.
The tax wedge is therefore the sum of the payroll tax rate, the income tax
rate and the consumption tax rate. The data is taken from Nickel et al (2001)
and the update Nickel (2003) and is based on the CEP-OECD database of the
London School of Economics. See Nickel et al (2001) for an exact description.
Bene￿t Replacement Rate and Bene￿t Duration Index (brr, bene￿trep, bb)
There are several indicators available. The gross bene￿t replacement rate
is an indicator provided by the OECD in two year intervals (brr). The OECD
measure is de￿ned as the average of the gross unemployment bene￿t replace-
ment rates for two earning levels, three family situations and three durations
of unemployment. A second indicator is provided by Nickell et al (2001) and
based on OECD ￿gures. This index describes the replacement rate averaged
over family types for the ￿rst year of unemployment (bene￿trep). The same
authors also provide an index ranging from 0 to 1, which captures the duration
of bene￿t entitlements. Following Nickell et. al., I use the interaction of these
two indices in the regression (bb). All of the indicators were used also sepa-
rately, in order to check for the robustness of the signi￿cance and in order to
determine which indicator gives the most conclusive results. Unfortunately, no
constellation gave rise to persistent signi￿cant results.
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL)
The OECD does not provide a long term series of the EPL index. Therefore,
the EPL index is taken from Nickel et al (2001) and the updates available
in Nickel (2003), which is based on four sources that are re-scaled in order
to make them comparable. The sources are: Blanchard and Wolfers (2000),
Lazear (1990), the OECD EPL index and the most recent value is provided by
Nicoletti et al (2000). The index ranges from 0 to 2, increasing with the degree
of protection. The values used for the ￿rst ￿ve periods in this paper are the
averages over the Nickel et. al. (2001) ￿gures and for the last period the value
provided in Nickel (2003) for the year 1998. Due to the various sources this
series may have some drawbacks in the exact measurement.
53Appendix VI: Descriptive Statistics
The following two graphs show the average unemployment rate over the
sample countries that are grouped into the three categories according to the
wage bargaining index. The pictures suggest that since the 80s the hump-shaped



























When excluding all the countries that switched regimes during the analyzed
period, the hump-shape appears already in the early eighties (the excluded coun-
tries are: Australia, Belgium, Ireland, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
and the UK). This however, reduces the size of the sample to only 12 countries
which reduces the power of the argument.

























5455Appendix VII: Regression Results
565758Appendix VIII: Simulations of the E⁄ect of a Change
in the EPL Index
The composite e⁄ect of a change in EPL is a separate e⁄ect coming from the
reduction in EPL plus a e⁄ect coming from the Pressure Index which varies with
system, degree of openness and, the level of EPL at which a country starts. The
following examples give an impression of how di⁄erent changes in EPL a⁄ect
the unemployment rate. For example, a country which has an initial EPL value
of 1.9, a degree of openness (imports) of 45%, and exhibits a centralized system
of bargaining, will experience an increase in the unemployment rate by 1.66 %
points, when reducing the EPL to 1.5 (4th row, 4th column).
Regression B
Openness
Reduction to H M L H ML H ML H ML
1.8 0.40 0.29 0.41 0.44 0.36 0.45 0.48 0.43 0.49 0.52 0.49 0.52
1.7 0.78 0.55 0.81 0.86 0.70 0.89 0.95 0.84 0.96 1.04 0.98 1.04
1.6 1.13 0.78 1.18 1.27 1.00 1.31 1.41 1.23 1.43 1.55 1.46 1.56
1.5 1.46 0.96 1.53 1.66 1.28 1.71 1.85 1.60 1.89 2.05 1.92 2.07
1.4 1.76 1.08 1.85 2.02 1.51 2.09 2.28 1.94 2.33 2.54 2.37 2.57
1.3 2.01 1.14 2.13 2.35 1.69 2.44 2.69 2.25 2.75 3.03 2.81 3.06
1.2 2.21 1.11 2.36 2.64 1.81 2.75 3.07 2.52 3.14 3.50 3.22 3.54
1.1 2.35 0.97 2.54 2.89 1.85 3.02 3.42 2.73 3.51 3.95 3.61 4.00
1 2.41 0.70 2.63 3.07 1.79 3.24 3.73 2.87 3.84 4.39 3.96 4.45
0.9 2.35 0.24 2.63 3.16 1.58 3.37 3.98 2.93 4.12 4.79 4.27 4.86
0.8 2.13 -0.47 2.48 3.14 1.19 3.40 4.15 2.85 4.33 5.16 4.51 5.25
0.7 1.70 -1.55 2.13 2.96 0.52 3.28 4.21 2.59 4.43 5.47 4.66 5.58
0.6 0.93 -3.18 1.48 2.52 -0.56 2.93 4.11 2.06 4.39 5.70 4.68 5.84
0.5 -0.37 -5.67 0.34 1.69 -2.29 2.22 3.74 1.09 4.10 5.80 4.47 5.98
0.4 -2.60 -9.70 -1.65 0.16 -5.17 0.87 2.91 -0.64 3.38 5.66 3.89 5.90
Regression B
Openness
Reduction to H M L H ML H ML H ML
1.4 0.30 0.12 0.32 0.36 0.23 0.38 0.43 0.34 0.44 0.49 0.45 0.50
1.3 0.55 0.18 0.60 0.69 0.42 0.73 0.84 0.65 0.86 0.98 0.89 0.99
1.2 0.75 0.15 0.83 0.99 0.54 1.05 1.22 0.92 1.26 1.45 1.30 1.47
1.1 0.89 0.02 1.01 1.23 0.57 1.32 1.57 1.13 1.63 1.91 1.69 1.93
1 0.94 -0.26 1.11 1.41 0.51 1.53 1.88 1.28 1.96 2.34 2.04 2.38
0.9 0.89 -0.71 1.10 1.51 0.31 1.67 2.13 1.33 2.23 2.75 2.35 2.80
0.8 0.67 -1.43 0.95 1.49 -0.09 1.70 2.30 1.25 2.44 3.11 2.59 3.18
0.7 0.24 -2.51 0.60 1.30 -0.76 1.57 2.36 0.99 2.55 3.43 2.74 3.52
0.6 -0.53 -4.13 -0.05 0.86 -1.84 1.22 2.26 0.46 2.50 3.65 2.75 3.77
0.5 -1.83 -6.63 -1.19 0.03 -3.57 0.51 1.89 -0.51 2.21 3.75 2.55 3.91
0.4 -4.06 -10.66 -3.18 -1.50 -6.45 -0.84 1.06 -2.24 1.50 3.61 1.96 3.83
Regression B
Openness
Reduction to H M L H ML H ML H ML
1 0.05 -0.27 0.10 0.18 -0.06 0.21 0.31 0.14 0.33 0.43 0.35 0.45
0.9 -0.01 -0.73 0.09 0.28 -0.27 0.35 0.56 0.19 0.61 0.84 0.66 0.86
0.8 -0.22 -1.45 -0.06 0.26 -0.66 0.38 0.73 0.12 0.81 1.21 0.90 1.25
0.7 -0.65 -2.52 -0.41 0.07 -1.33 0.26 0.79 -0.14 0.92 1.52 1.05 1.58
0.6 -1.42 -4.15 -1.06 -0.37 -2.41 -0.09 0.69 -0.67 0.87 1.75 1.07 1.84
0.5 -2.72 -6.65 -2.20 -1.20 -4.14 -0.81 0.32 -1.64 0.58 1.84 0.86 1.98
0.4 -4.95 -10.68 -4.19 -2.73 -7.03 -2.16 -0.51 -3.38 -0.13 1.71 0.28 1.90
Regression B
Openness
Reduction to H M L H ML H ML H ML
0.6 -0.77 -1.62 -0.65 -0.44 -1.08 -0.35 -0.10 -0.53 -0.05 0.23 0.01 0.26
0.5 -2.07 -4.12 -1.79 -1.27 -2.81 -1.06 -0.47 -1.50 -0.34 0.32 -0.19 0.39
0.4 -4.30 -8.15 -3.78 -2.80 -5.69 -2.42 -1.31 -3.23 -1.05 0.19 -0.78 0.32
EPL Starting Level: 0.7
60 45 30 15
EPL Starting Level: 1.1
60 45 30 15
EPL Starting Level: 1.5
60 45 30 15
EPL Starting Level: 1.9
60 45 30 15
59When performing the same simulation for the regression model B1, which
includes an AR(1) process, the general pattern remains. However, the di⁄erence
in the e⁄ect of a given change in the EPL on the unemployment rate under the




Reduction to H M L H ML H ML H ML
1.8 0.24 0.18 0.24 0.29 0.24 0.29 0.34 0.31 0.34 0.39 0.38 0.39
1.7 0.46 0.32 0.46 0.57 0.46 0.57 0.67 0.61 0.68 0.78 0.75 0.78
1.6 0.65 0.43 0.66 0.82 0.66 0.83 0.99 0.88 0.99 1.16 1.11 1.16
1.5 0.81 0.50 0.82 1.05 0.82 1.06 1.29 1.14 1.30 1.53 1.46 1.54
1.4 0.92 0.51 0.93 1.25 0.93 1.26 1.57 1.36 1.58 1.90 1.79 1.90
1.3 0.99 0.45 1.00 1.41 1.00 1.42 1.83 1.56 1.83 2.24 2.11 2.25
1.2 0.99 0.31 1.01 1.52 1.01 1.53 2.05 1.71 2.06 2.58 2.41 2.58
1.1 0.91 0.06 0.93 1.57 0.93 1.59 2.23 1.81 2.24 2.89 2.68 2.90
1 0.73 -0.32 0.76 1.54 0.76 1.57 2.36 1.84 2.38 3.18 2.92 3.19
0.9 0.40 -0.89 0.44 1.41 0.44 1.44 2.42 1.77 2.44 3.43 3.11 3.44
0.8 -0.11 -1.72 -0.07 1.14 -0.07 1.17 2.39 1.58 2.41 3.64 3.23 3.65
0.7 -0.90 -2.90 -0.84 0.66 -0.84 0.70 2.22 1.21 2.24 3.77 3.27 3.79
0.6 -2.10 -4.63 -2.03 -0.13 -2.03 -0.08 1.84 0.57 1.87 3.80 3.17 3.82
0.5 -3.95 -7.22 -3.86 -1.41 -3.86 -1.34 1.13 -0.50 1.18 3.67 2.86 3.70
0.4 -6.96 -11.34 -6.84 -3.55 -6.84 -3.47 -0.15 -2.34 -0.09 3.26 2.16 3.29
Regression B1
Openness
Reduction to H M L H ML H ML H ML
1.4 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.20 0.12 0.20 0.28 0.23 0.28 0.36 0.34 0.36
1.3 0.18 -0.05 0.19 0.36 0.19 0.36 0.53 0.42 0.54 0.71 0.65 0.71
1.2 0.18 -0.19 0.19 0.47 0.19 0.48 0.76 0.57 0.76 1.04 0.95 1.05
1.1 0.10 -0.43 0.12 0.52 0.12 0.53 0.94 0.67 0.95 1.36 1.22 1.36
1 -0.08 -0.82 -0.06 0.49 -0.06 0.51 1.07 0.70 1.08 1.65 1.46 1.65
0.9 -0.40 -1.39 -0.38 0.36 -0.38 0.38 1.13 0.64 1.14 1.90 1.65 1.90
0.8 -0.92 -2.21 -0.88 0.09 -0.88 0.12 1.10 0.45 1.11 2.10 1.78 2.11
0.7 -1.71 -3.40 -1.66 -0.39 -1.66 -0.36 0.92 0.08 0.95 2.24 1.81 2.25
0.6 -2.90 -5.12 -2.84 -1.18 -2.84 -1.13 0.55 -0.56 0.58 2.27 1.72 2.29
0.5 -4.76 -7.72 -4.68 -2.46 -4.68 -2.40 -0.16 -1.64 -0.12 2.14 1.40 2.16
0.4 -7.77 -11.84 -7.66 -4.60 -7.66 -4.52 -1.44 -3.48 -1.39 1.72 0.70 1.75
Regression B1
Openness
Reduction to H M L H ML H ML H ML
1 -0.18 -0.39 -0.18 -0.03 -0.18 -0.02 0.13 0.03 0.13 0.29 0.24 0.29
0.9 -0.51 -0.95 -0.49 -0.16 -0.49 -0.15 0.19 -0.03 0.20 0.54 0.43 0.54
0.8 -1.02 -1.78 -1.00 -0.43 -1.00 -0.42 0.16 -0.22 0.17 0.74 0.55 0.75
0.7 -1.81 -2.96 -1.78 -0.91 -1.78 -0.89 -0.02 -0.59 0.00 0.88 0.59 0.89
0.6 -3.01 -4.69 -2.96 -1.70 -2.96 -1.67 -0.39 -1.23 -0.37 0.91 0.49 0.92
0.5 -4.86 -7.29 -4.80 -2.98 -4.80 -2.93 -1.10 -2.31 -1.07 0.78 0.18 0.80
0.4 -7.87 -11.40 -7.77 -5.12 -7.77 -5.05 -2.38 -4.15 -2.33 0.36 -0.52 0.39
Regression B1
Openness
Reduction to H M L H ML H ML H ML
0.6 -1.20 -1.73 -1.18 -0.79 -1.18 -0.78 -0.38 -0.64 -0.37 0.03 -0.10 0.04
0.5 -3.05 -4.32 -3.02 -2.07 -3.02 -2.04 -1.08 -1.72 -1.07 -0.10 -0.41 -0.09
0.4 -6.06 -8.44 -6.00 -4.21 -6.00 -4.16 -2.36 -3.55 -2.33 -0.52 -1.11 -0.50
EPL Starting Level: 0.7
60 45 30 15
EPL Starting Level: 1.1
60 45 30 15
EPL Starting Level: 1.5
60 45 30 15
EPL Starting Level: 1.9
60 45 30 15
Also model B2, the estimation in the di⁄erence, suggests a simlar e⁄ect of
the EPL on the unemployment rate, where the exact values range in between
the ￿rst two models:
60Regression B2
Openness
Reduction to H ML H ML H ML H ML
1.8 0.42 0.36 0.41 0.46 0.42 0.45 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.54 0.53 0.54
1.7 0.82 0.69 0.80 0.91 0.81 0.89 0.99 0.93 0.99 1.08 1.05 1.08
1.6 1.19 0.99 1.17 1.33 1.18 1.32 1.47 1.37 1.46 1.61 1.56 1.61
1.5 1.54 1.25 1.51 1.74 1.53 1.71 1.94 1.80 1.92 2.14 2.07 2.13
1.4 1.85 1.47 1.81 2.12 1.83 2.09 2.39 2.20 2.37 2.66 2.56 2.65
1.3 2.13 1.63 2.07 2.47 2.10 2.43 2.82 2.57 2.79 3.16 3.04 3.15
1.2 2.35 1.72 2.27 2.78 2.31 2.73 3.22 2.91 3.18 3.66 3.50 3.64
1.1 2.50 1.72 2.41 3.04 2.46 2.97 3.59 3.20 3.54 4.13 3.94 4.11
1 2.57 1.60 2.45 3.24 2.52 3.15 3.92 3.43 3.86 4.59 4.35 4.56
0.9 2.52 1.32 2.38 3.35 2.46 3.24 4.18 3.59 4.11 5.02 4.72 4.98
0.8 2.31 0.83 2.14 3.34 2.23 3.21 4.37 3.63 4.29 5.40 5.03 5.36
0.7 1.88 0.04 1.66 3.16 1.78 3.00 4.45 3.53 4.34 5.73 5.27 5.68
0.6 1.10 -1.22 0.83 2.73 0.99 2.52 4.36 3.19 4.22 5.98 5.40 5.91
0.5 -0.21 -3.22 -0.56 1.89 -0.36 1.62 3.99 2.49 3.81 6.09 5.34 6.00
0.4 -2.48 -6.50 -2.95 0.34 -2.68 -0.02 3.15 1.14 2.91 5.96 4.96 5.84
Regression B2
Openness
Reduction to H ML H ML H ML H ML
1.4 0.31 0.22 0.30 0.38 0.31 0.37 0.45 0.40 0.44 0.52 0.49 0.51
1.3 0.59 0.38 0.56 0.73 0.57 0.71 0.88 0.77 0.87 1.02 0.97 1.02
1.2 0.81 0.47 0.77 1.04 0.79 1.01 1.28 1.11 1.26 1.52 1.43 1.51
1.1 0.96 0.46 0.90 1.30 0.93 1.26 1.65 1.40 1.62 1.99 1.87 1.98
1 1.03 0.34 0.94 1.50 0.99 1.44 1.98 1.64 1.94 2.45 2.28 2.43
0.9 0.98 0.07 0.87 1.61 0.93 1.53 2.24 1.79 2.19 2.88 2.65 2.85
0.8 0.77 -0.42 0.63 1.60 0.71 1.50 2.43 1.84 2.36 3.26 2.97 3.23
0.7 0.34 -1.22 0.15 1.42 0.26 1.29 2.51 1.73 2.42 3.59 3.21 3.55
0.6 -0.44 -2.48 -0.68 0.99 -0.54 0.81 2.42 1.40 2.30 3.84 3.33 3.78
0.5 -1.75 -4.47 -2.07 0.15 -1.89 -0.09 2.05 0.69 1.89 3.95 3.27 3.87
0.4 -4.02 -7.76 -4.46 -1.40 -4.21 -1.73 1.21 -0.66 0.99 3.82 2.89 3.71
Regression B2
Openness
Reduction to H ML H ML H ML H ML
1 0.07 -0.12 0.05 0.20 0.06 0.18 0.33 0.23 0.32 0.46 0.41 0.45
0.9 0.02 -0.39 -0.03 0.31 0.00 0.27 0.59 0.39 0.57 0.88 0.78 0.87
0.8 -0.19 -0.88 -0.27 0.30 -0.22 0.24 0.78 0.44 0.74 1.27 1.10 1.25
0.7 -0.62 -1.68 -0.75 0.12 -0.68 0.03 0.86 0.33 0.80 1.60 1.33 1.57
0.6 -1.39 -2.94 -1.58 -0.31 -1.47 -0.45 0.77 -0.01 0.68 1.85 1.46 1.80
0.5 -2.71 -4.93 -2.97 -1.15 -2.82 -1.35 0.40 -0.71 0.27 1.96 1.40 1.89
0.4 -4.97 -8.22 -5.36 -2.71 -5.14 -2.99 -0.44 -2.06 -0.63 1.83 1.02 1.73
Regression B2
Openness
Reduction to H ML H ML H ML H ML
0.6 -0.77 -1.26 -0.83 -0.43 -0.80 -0.48 -0.09 -0.34 -0.12 0.25 0.12 0.23
0.5 -2.09 -3.25 -2.22 -1.27 -2.15 -1.38 -0.46 -1.04 -0.53 0.36 0.06 0.32
0.4 -4.35 -6.54 -4.61 -2.83 -4.46 -3.02 -1.30 -2.39 -1.43 0.23 -0.32 0.16
EPL Starting Level: 0.7
60 45 30 15
EPL Starting Level: 1.1
60 45 30 15
EPL Starting Level: 1.5
60 45 30 15
EPL Starting Level: 1.9
60 45 30 15
With a very low degree of openness (<15%) it requires in most cases a
reduction below an EPL Index value of 0.5 in order to generate a reduction in
unemployment rates. The picture that emerges is that closed economies tend
to perform better when moving to more restrictive EPL, while open economies
will perform better when moving to less restrictive EPL.
61Regression B3
Openness
Reduction to H M L H ML H ML H ML
1.8 0.45 0.37 0.46 0.51 0.45 0.52 0.57 0.53 0.57 0.63 0.61 0.63
1.7 0.87 0.71 0.90 0.99 0.87 1.02 1.12 1.04 1.14 1.24 1.20 1.25
1.6 1.26 1.00 1.31 1.46 1.27 1.50 1.66 1.53 1.68 1.85 1.79 1.87
1.5 1.61 1.25 1.68 1.89 1.62 1.95 2.17 1.99 2.21 2.45 2.36 2.47
1.4 1.91 1.42 2.01 2.29 1.92 2.36 2.66 2.42 2.72 3.04 2.92 3.07
1.3 2.15 1.52 2.28 2.64 2.17 2.74 3.13 2.81 3.19 3.62 3.46 3.65
1.2 2.32 1.53 2.49 2.94 2.34 3.06 3.55 3.16 3.64 4.17 3.97 4.21
1.1 2.39 1.41 2.60 3.16 2.42 3.32 3.93 3.44 4.04 4.70 4.46 4.75
1 2.35 1.13 2.60 3.30 2.38 3.49 4.25 3.64 4.38 5.20 4.90 5.27
0.9 2.14 0.63 2.45 3.31 2.18 3.55 4.49 3.73 4.65 5.66 5.29 5.74
0.8 1.71 -0.16 2.10 3.16 1.76 3.45 4.61 3.68 4.81 6.07 5.60 6.17
0.7 0.95 -1.37 1.44 2.77 1.02 3.13 4.58 3.42 4.82 6.39 5.81 6.52
0.6 -0.28 -3.22 0.34 2.02 -0.19 2.48 4.31 2.84 4.62 6.60 5.86 6.75
0.5 -2.27 -6.07 -1.48 0.69 -2.16 1.29 3.65 1.75 4.05 6.61 5.66 6.81
0.4 -5.61 -10.70 -4.54 -1.64 -5.46 -0.84 2.33 -0.22 2.86 6.29 5.02 6.56
Regression B3
Openness
Reduction to H M L H ML H ML H ML
1.4 0.30 0.18 0.33 0.40 0.30 0.42 0.49 0.43 0.51 0.59 0.56 0.59
1.3 0.54 0.28 0.60 0.75 0.55 0.79 0.96 0.82 0.98 1.16 1.10 1.18
1.2 0.71 0.28 0.80 1.05 0.72 1.11 1.38 1.17 1.43 1.72 1.61 1.74
1.1 0.79 0.16 0.92 1.27 0.81 1.37 1.76 1.45 1.83 2.25 2.09 2.28
1 0.74 -0.12 0.92 1.41 0.76 1.55 2.08 1.65 2.17 2.75 2.54 2.80
0.9 0.53 -0.62 0.77 1.42 0.56 1.60 2.32 1.74 2.44 3.21 2.92 3.27
0.8 0.10 -1.41 0.41 1.27 0.14 1.51 2.44 1.69 2.60 3.62 3.24 3.69
0.7 -0.65 -2.62 -0.24 0.88 -0.60 1.19 2.41 1.43 2.61 3.94 3.45 4.04
0.6 -1.88 -4.46 -1.34 0.13 -1.81 0.53 2.14 0.85 2.41 4.15 3.50 4.28
0.5 -3.88 -7.32 -3.16 -1.20 -3.78 -0.66 1.48 -0.24 1.84 4.16 3.30 4.34
0.4 -7.22 -11.95 -6.23 -3.53 -7.08 -2.79 0.15 -2.21 0.65 3.84 2.66 4.09
Regression B3
Openness
Reduction to H M L H ML H ML H ML
1 -0.05 -0.28 0.00 0.14 -0.04 0.17 0.32 0.20 0.34 0.50 0.44 0.51
0.9 -0.26 -0.78 -0.15 0.15 -0.24 0.23 0.56 0.30 0.61 0.96 0.83 0.99
0.8 -0.69 -1.57 -0.50 0.00 -0.66 0.13 0.68 0.24 0.77 1.37 1.15 1.41
0.7 -1.44 -2.78 -1.16 -0.40 -1.40 -0.19 0.65 -0.02 0.79 1.69 1.36 1.76
0.6 -2.67 -4.63 -2.26 -1.15 -2.61 -0.84 0.37 -0.60 0.58 1.90 1.41 2.00
0.5 -4.67 -7.48 -4.08 -2.47 -4.59 -2.03 -0.28 -1.69 0.01 1.91 1.21 2.06
0.4 -8.00 -12.11 -7.14 -4.81 -7.88 -4.16 -1.61 -3.66 -1.18 1.59 0.56 1.81
Regression B3
Openness
Reduction to H M L H ML H ML H ML
0.6 -1.23 -1.84 -1.10 -0.75 -1.21 -0.66 -0.27 -0.58 -0.21 0.21 0.05 0.24
0.5 -3.23 -4.70 -2.92 -2.08 -3.18 -1.85 -0.93 -1.67 -0.77 0.22 -0.15 0.30
0.4 -6.56 -9.33 -5.98 -4.41 -6.48 -3.97 -2.26 -3.64 -1.97 -0.10 -0.79 0.04
EPL Starting Level: 1.9
EPL Starting Level: 1.5
15 30 45 60
EPL Starting Level: 1.1
15 30 45 60
EPL Starting Level: 0.7
15 30 45 60
15 30 45 60
The sample presented here shows one drawback of the index. When EPL
is reduced to very low levels and a country exhibits a high degree of openness,
the reduction in unemployment takes unlikely high values. However, this should
not a⁄ect the sample as average EPL values are well above this threshold and
recorded changes over time have been much smaller. Nevertheless, a more pre-
cise pressure index, which corrects for the ￿bias at the lower end￿of EPL, might
give even better estimation results.
62Appendix IX: Simulation of the Hump under Di⁄erent
Degrees of Openness60
60The values are computed for the average sample EPL, which is equal to 1.1.
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